KINDRED SAYINGS ON BUDDHISM

BY
MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.LITT., M.A.

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Mrs. RHYS DAVIDS, D.Litt., M.A.

Maggo so párangamanáya.
(The Way this is for going to Beyond.)

Sutta-Nipāta, 1130.

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MĀTARĀ PIYAPUTTASSA

MAGGAGATASSA PARAṂGATASSA

UTTARĪGATASSA

FORESAY

The following four chapters were sent to the Calcutta Review at the request of the Editor that I should contribute something to that periodical. So far as I can claim to have any knowledge of the forward-looking, cultured man of India, both past and present, I have striven to keep him before me, and to address myself to him rather than to readers of other lands and other traditions. I believe that, as the heir to a great heritage, he has that to build upon which should in world-religion of the future play a great part. To stimulate him to build worthily for the assumption of that great part by his heirs is my aim. To do this I have tried to show how, in the message brought him of old by one of India's sons, his forefathers, albeit they felt its influence, turned aside both from the very spirit of that message and also from the distortions into which it developed under a system adverse to that spirit. I have tried here to show the Man, as by his very

nature yearning, willing to become the "More" because it is in his very nature to will, to become, eventually the "Most."

C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

Chipstead, Surrey, England.
September, 1929.

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KINDRED SAYINGS ON BUDDHISM

I

WILL AND THE WAY

When man began to take pleasure in talking about himself as man, and in listening to those who made a business of talking about man to men, they, and he through them, accepted certain ways of describing himself, and these ways only. Here is an instance: "Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker; let no man try to find out what seen-thing is, let him know the seer;...what doing is, let him know the doer; ...what pleasure and pain are, let him know the experiencer;...what going is, let him know the goer; what mind is, let him know the knower, thinker."* We may see here that he does not speak of will, nor try to describe man either as a willer, or as anything of the kind, such as tryer, desirer, wisher, wanter, striver. In many other passages of these old scriptures is

* Kauṣitakī Upaniṣad.

man described, but neither in them do we find man called willer, or the like, nor do we find a special, distinctive word corresponding to our 'will.'

These ancient scriptures are the oldest Indian Upanishads, or 'sittings.' They are said to date somewhen between B. C. 700 and a few centuries later, and contain many talks on man, his nature, his life and ways, and the whence and whither of him. They form but a limited basis for this talk of mine, but at any rate they are now accessible to the general reader, and enjoy quite a considerable reputation as a mine of ancient wisdom.

In just one or two places the reader will stumble upon the word 'will.' But the words so translated are not any of them equivalents of the English word, but are either mainly intellectual in meaning, or emotional. They are words more properly, more usually employed to mean mind, plan, purpose, desire. All of these words, it is true, involve will, but not one of them is just 'will.' Effort, seeking, trying to get, is not what they *mainly* express. But the translator had the word 'will' ready to hand, and so, when the original wording seemed to convey something more than either thinking or longing, he just wrote down 'will.'

But no word for just 'will' was there. Still less was there any word for willer.

One word that comes some way toward meaning will, that is, 'willing,' is *kāma*. This means wanting, wishing, desiring. The leading Sanskrit dictionary does not include 'will' in these equivalents, or at most only in compounds, or in its adverbial form. Professor Bloomfield, however, finds in *kāma* the Indian equivalent for will. He quotes as conclusive this passage from the Upanishads:—"Man is wholly formed from desire (*kāma*); as is his desire, so is his insight (? *kratu*); as is his insight, so does he the deed (*karma*); as he does the deed, so does he experience."*

And were *kāma* used always in the wide, *un*moral sense in which it is used in this passage, and further, did we ever find man described as desirer (*kāmetar*), in such contexts, we might rightly grant that there was, in this old literature, a worthy equivalent for will. But more usually *kāma* means, not any kind of desire, but sex-desire and sensuous desire. And when, at the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, the moral conscience of India was feeling 'growing pains,' and becoming troubled as

* *The Religion of the Veda*, p. 259. On *Kratu* cf. *infra* p. 69.

never before, *kāma* had become almost wholly associated with such desires and such pleasures. Very different are the words used in the scriptures of these cults for the desires stirring in man towards the Best, the Highest. These notable cults are both of them built up around the conception of man as by nature moving towards, or becoming something better or worse. They are India's very creeds of man as willer, as having will to choose the better, the worse. They place man in a long upward Way of effort, they urge him to earnest toil, to growth in worthiness, in holiness towards an ultimate goal. They wage incessant war against sloth, indifference and torpor. They created, to enforce this teaching, the word *bhāvanā*, 'make-to-become.' And yet we must say of their scriptures that which we said of those more or less older books: we find in them no worthy word for will, no worthy conception of man as willer. For them the word *kāma* was far too tainted to name man's efforts in quest of the Better. Hardly indeed did they bring themselves to use the somewhat less tainted word *chanda*, to express purpose. They guarded it by the prefix *dhamma*, righteous. They worded it as belonging only to the pre-saintly stage. They saw in it the wrestling of the learner.

The adept, the saint, for them, as for the rest of India, is he ' who knows, who sees,' not he who wills. He is one who chose the better way, who strove, who struggled forward, who won. He strives no longer. Desire, effort, endeavour have fallen off his disburdened shoulders, are put away like a discarded weapon after the fight.

Since however they worded the desire, the seeking, the quest, the struggle ; since they also worded man as ' doer ' and as ' goer,' is it reasonable to look for any closer parallels in their thought to will and willer? May not the absence of such be nothing more than an accident in the history of ideas and words?

Such a suggestion of the ' casual ' will not commend itself to the inquirer into the ' causal.' Moreover words, names for things, mattered tremendously to the man of ancient India. We can perhaps at this time of day afford to be more careless. But he was, as speaker, like a child playing with a wonderful and strange instrument. Every word counted for much.

Let me rather get clear what I mean by will, and by man as willer. I take will in the widest meaning the word can bear. Choosing, resolving, deciding are all modes of will, but ' to be willing ' underlies all these, and indeed

all that we are pleased to call our mind or intellect or intelligence.* All mind is self-directed activity, or the emotional reverberation of that.

'*You tak' the high road an' I'll tak' the low road...*' of the Scottish ballad tells of a self-directing activity, a work of seeking something, of trying to be, or to get something, and may serve to express in homely fashion what I mean. Now man as thus active is not fitly described as doer, or as goer. A machine may be fitly thus described, but we may not fitly describe a machine as self-directing (save figuratively), or as seeking, or as trying. And more: in describing thus a man, not a machine, our subject is, in so doing, and in consequence of so doing, to some extent changing, is altering from what he was before. He is becoming different in process of, and because of his self-directing. In willing, man comes-to-be; in willing lies 'werden'—Oh! why did we let our Anglo-Saxon parallel to that fine, sorely needed word drop out of use? The 'werden,' the becoming, may affect our body, our mind, or our possessions; it surely affects ourself, the very man. And because of this sure thing,

* More fully discussed by the writer in *The Will to Peace*, Ch. VII, and in *Will and Willer*, Ch. II.

'werden,' or becoming or coming-to-be is the closest corollary, pendant, consequence, accompaniment of will. We cannot have the one without the other.

It will be said: 'this is too broad a definition of will. Will, as we use it, is really minding and willing together, as in purpose, intention, choice. You should use 'conation,' or other more specific terms for the broader meaning you give to will; and you should leave out consequences of willing.'

This, I would reply, is to talk from the special and limited point of view of the School and the Manual. The same protest has there been used for the words 'thinking' and 'thought.' But I write for the general reader, not for the classroom; for 'everyman,' not for the special student. And 'everyman' does not show the slightest inclination to adopt 'conation,' or 'libîdo' (thanks be!), or any out-of-the-way words for what he feels is so big and traditional as is will, willing (let alone thought, thinking). Nor is he yet—and may he as everyman never be!—given to thinking of himself in transverse sections, so as to consider himself cut off from consequences. On the other hand, he needs to consider these a little more. He does not yet bring himself to realiz

all that he is, all that he has become, all that he is becoming, all that he may yet become, as willer wielding will. His are now the words :—' willer wielding will.' Let him hold tight to them ; let him see himself as willer ' werdend,' becoming, growing. So let him for yet a few minutes consider literatures which lack this word-treasure ; let him puzzle a moment over the problem of it.

The Indian had in his tongues the twin-root whence came will. Those twins were the Aryan *wal* and *war*. The Indo-Aryans held on to *war* (*vara*). The Europeans held more to *wal*. They bore Westward *war* also, and to it we owe *werden* and ward and worth—all priceless treasures. We know how *l* and *r* get interchanged in different tongues, and in one and the same tongue. We know the ' all-light ' that comes from China ; we hear a Japanese say, he is a ' rucky ' man. Indian books give us *raja* ; yet the rock-inscriptions of Asoka prefer *laja*. And corresponding to the root of ' rupture,' we find in Sanskrit both *lup* and *rup*. But of the root-forms *war* and *wal*, the Indian decidedly preferred, in *vara*, the former. Here any way he had a wordstem which he could have used to express what we came to express with our twin *wal*. From *wal* we, of the

Western Aryan immigrants, notably through Latins and Teutons, 'the greatest communal tryers' of all our stock, built up will-words :— *volo, velle, voluntas, wahl, wollen, wohl,* will(e), well, wealth. As compared with this strong lusty tribe, the Indian parallel *vara* shows a weak and sorry growth. *Vara* is used, not very often, for 'choice,' 'thing chosen,' 'thing to be granted.' In rhetoric it is used for 'beautiful,' 'excellent' (the 'elect,' the chosen). But *vara* never grew up as did its Western twin. *And no other word grew up in its place.*

Does the wish arise to test swiftly and easily how little the will figures in Indian thought? Then take up a very useful work to be found in any worthy library :—the last volume of the great series founded by Max Müller, the Sacred Books of the East—the Index-volume compiled by the well-known Indological scholar, Dr. Moritz Winternitz. Look under Mind and then under Will, and see how few, absolutely and relatively, are the references to will in a series consisting mainly of Indian writings. Consider how impossible this would have been, had the compiler found any insistence in the texts, in the translations on something which could literally only be rendered by

Will. With this great little word so handy, English translators would have been very ready to use it, had they had any excuse. As it is, they now and then use it for the word *manas*, mind, and for *sankalpa*, plan. Hence the scarcity in references to will is not any fault of theirs. Deussen, historian, philosopher and translator, was in strong sympathy with much in Indian thought. His works contain excellent indexes of 'noteworthy ideas.' In not one of these indexes is there a single reference to the mention of will in any original! There is a little section on 'freedom of the will' (omitted from the Index), but it might as fitly have been called 'freedom without will.' Mind, and work of mind (*manaskṛta*) are called in to represent will. Neither has Mr. Das Gupta nor Mr. O. Strauss, as Dr. Winternitz reminds me, any reference to will in the indexes to their treatises on Indian philosophy.

Now the Indian mind is very introspective, and it is very fond of definitions. The Indian —the Hindu, if you will—liked to ponder over and talk about the powers, the needs, the limitations of man. He began very early to study both mind and man. He believed in learning, in knowledge. He honoured the teacher, the man who talked about man, exceedingly. He

studied the way of impression and idea. He grew to be deeply concerned with the taming and training of the 'self,' with right choice at the parting of the ways, with the upward way of effort towards the Better. The more curious then is his failure to develop his own word *vara*, or to find any real equivalent to express that in man which is so vital in those matters. To discern and to word that in man, as which and by which man turns to a better, words it as such :—This is the way !—and tries to walk in it—seem to call for the words 'will' and 'willer' as indispensable.

One of India's noblest Helpers of men taught religion—that is to say, the warding of man through the worlds—as a Way of living at one's best. Yet he did not teach it as a gospel of will to willers. Will and willer he left unworded, implicit. When he began by addressing himself to a little group of willers seeking, like himself a better way, and spoke of that way as a 'Middle Course,' or Path, neither worldly nor ascetic, he did not remind his hearers of that in them which responded to the Better they were inwardly aware of. Had such as he begun that 'First Sermon' *today*, it is possible that he would put it like this :—

"Man is always reaching out after a better,

after something he will choose as likely to be well for him. And in seeking that, he becomes a little other, little by little, than he was. The way he chooses makes him as he will be. Wayfarer is he, seeking the goal of the utterly 'well,' the end of ill, seeking it through the worlds. Such is man's nature. He cannot do other; seek he must, though often wrongly. Go and teach that."

For it is clear, from the surviving record of that first sermon, that Gotama, called the Buddha, relied, in it, on men of good-will responding to his message by their having that in them which we call will. But he did not call upon them as willers. *He had not the word.* He used for it *dhamma*, a word changed in much Buddhist usage to mean "doctrine," or religion.

I remember when over thirty years ago my husband and I were in America and were leaving Buffalo after a lecture on the gospel of Buddhism, and how our worthy host, a man of the market, in bidding us farewell, was rather amused over a gospel being chiefly concerned with an 'Eightfold Path.' It was not up to me then to speak; I was certainly not ready. But I now think that if that 'gospel' of which we have, of the original elements, only a few

fragments, had been worded to our New World friend after the way of his own newer world, it might have appealed more to him. Thus :— "There is in every man, every woman a will to seek to have, or to be something that's figured as better. When it's a matter of moral betterment, or of being safe hereafter, we call that 'will' *conscience*. You are, every one of you, aware that, at any moment, but especially when you have to choose, you can be a better man than you usually are ; you know that you can choose a better way or a worse way, or may be a best way out of several ways." Our friend would probably have said :—"Ah ! I see ; Buddhism was a gospel of following the inner monitor, conscience. Well, it's curious they didn't say so."

This is the way in which the man who does not study the growth of language would speak. As to that, Sokrates spoke of the 'monitor' as a kind of *person* ; St. Paul spoke of it as a 'law' ; but no one anywhere, I believe, spoke of it by the peculiar, and as I hold unsatisfactory word 'conscience' *till modern times*. Conscience is a word which shares the fate of the Indian word 'manas,' mind. It has got to do duty for both self-awareness, which is conscience, and also for that self-directing,

or will, which shapes our actions. Without will, self-awareness would be a purely stationary thing, of no practical use whatever. I look forward to a day, when we shall no more speak of conscience, leaving will to be vaguely understood, but when we shall speak of the willer and the will, leaving conscience to be understood as the will made articulate, the will in word, the willer self-worded. We shall range conscience under the wider genus 'will.'

To return to India: there was in that central message of Gotama a wonderful opportunity for uplifting the life of man among his fellowmen. We know how, like Christianity, Buddhism as a missionary cult spread far and wide. We know also how, like Christianity, it realized that opportunity in part, in part it did not. In part it did, in that, albeit with makeshift words, it called upon man's will to work towards righteousness and ultimate salvation. The self, it said, is changeable, ductile, docile. It did not saddle itself with any obsession about unchangeable instincts. 'Grow,' it taught, 'make the pure self, the wise mind, to become. Stir up energy; foster righteous desire. Inertness, sloth are fatal to you as Wayfarer. Man's good self is judge over his worse self.' To be at last, to become in some

future state or even here below a man of perfect 'worth' (*arahan*), rather than any temporary heaven-world, was made the ultimate goal. And man was bidden to shape deed, word and thought, not according to tradition, or orthodoxy, or any teacher as such, but only according as any teaching conduced to man's 'more-welfare.'

Such a gospel might have brought out and worded the will, which it implicitly fostered so well. It might have recreated the parallels *vara* and *varetar*, for it was much given to bringing forward new words and to putting its new wine into old bottles. But it was hindered, yes, and it hindered itself.

First, it was hindered. With the whole of ancient India it inherited the old attitude, that man is by nature beholder, contemplator, namer, receiver of impressions, reacting to that which comes to him. It is man's earliest picture of himself. He sees, he knows, he feels, he names. He has not yet discerned that, to do all this, he must be a fount, a source of radiant energy, and not only so when he comes out in choice and in action. And hence he did not call himself willer as much as, let alone more than, seer, knower and the rest. It was ever so much later in time when he began

to put will in the forefront of his religions, if indeed he can even then be said to have done so. In this way the Buddhist, like the Jain, was hindered by the heavy hand of the past.

And both cults hindered themselves. It is true that they looked upon life, when it is truly worthy, as upward effort towards attainment. But both held, that nothing in the way of higher, and highest attainment could be won without shearing away the greater part of life, that is, of development in the world as men among men. Body, man's chief instrument, without which mind could do nothing, was for the Jain aspirant a guilty criminal, for the Buddhist aspirant it was an ass in blinkers. Mind, working by body, was called away from the home, from the production of the necessary or the beautiful, from the discovery of nature's secrets, from the world's laboratory of experiment for the common welfare in the common life. All this was called *hīna*: the low thing. Both monk and ascetic made, it is true, demands upon will. They called it by the fine word '*viriya*' ('strong-man-ity') and other words signifying endeavour. *Viriya* and *vīra* could have been used for a theory of man as willer, no less than *vara*. But the bedrock nature of man as being *viriya*:—this is *never put forward*.

Viriya, *chanda* were necessary to win high worth, but this being won, they were to be suppressed. The saint was will-less, for he had 'done what was to be done.' What yet remained for him—the utter, or 'Pari'-nirvāṇa—so far from being conceived as a going on from strength to strength, was judged to be ineffable, or only to be worded by a negation.

In these ways then did Buddhism hinder itself from framing a doctrine of 'man' which can satisfy the new world that is ours to-day. Its first call was to man the willer, that is, the seeker after, the chooser of the Better, who inevitably becomes better in seeking the better. This, it said, would make for the happy life here and hereafter. But apparently the only way to spread a new gospel there and then was through the instrumentality of men who had 'left the world.' It was only through the artificial life-perspective of the recluse or the monk that it could reach and be honoured by the multitude. And hence it is, that in the monk-scriptures of Buddhism we find a teaching, which made appeal to the central fact in man's nature, his radiating will-to-well, but at the same time twisted and half-starved it. Men sought naturally then, as now, for fuller, happier life both here and hereafter. And life

was looked upon as a 'becoming' (*bhava*). But that will to life the monk taught them to call 'thirst,' or craving; and, whereas the earnest man was exhorted to 'make-become' (*bhāveti*) wisdom and worth, 'becoming' (*bhava*) as development of life in this and other worlds, was a thing to be suppressed. Moreover, it was assumed there was no 'he' who willed to live, or suppressed that will; there was only body and mind. And the nobler life was only to be led as monk, fed and 'run' by the people.

* * * *

All this grew up in a very old world of our Aryan fellowmen, in a little corner of our now much widened world. There was the great message calling on man's will to lessen suffering and to safeguard his future, not by sacrifice, ritual and priest, but by the worthiness of his life, by kindness, simple earnestness and candour. But the message came to a world where man's nature was not quite so well understood as we now understand it, or should understand it to-day. It was because of this, that true words for that nature had not been found. We of the new world, the bigger earth, have much, much of high worth that the old Buddhist had

not, did not know, was not ready to know. Among these treasures is a better insight into will, into man as willer. And it is because of that insight that we have developed all unawares our Aryan Wal, not only into *val*, to be worth, and *Wahl*, choice, but also into the various forms of Will, and into Well, the thing we will to be.

Let us not speculate how Buddhism might have been helped, had it inherited these words, as we have inherited them. Our business is to exploit our heritage. We have barely begun to do that. We are at the parting of the ways. Either we shall follow most of the newer manuals, and half strangle, or shelve these strong words, or we shall see in them the very rhythm to the melody of life. Very impressive and pathetic is the earnestness of the Buddhist scriptures seeking to train the man as willer with self-directed will, when they had neither insight of him as such, nor words so to express him, and when they were hindered, so trying, by the wrong views I have mentioned. We have not their excuse, and yet almost we go on as if we were no less hindered than they. We are not barred, as they were by a constricted will and a constricted word. And we have long been free. Yet for all that, we are too much

like men who have but just come out from a prison-cave. What then in this matter of word and will do we lack?

We might put it like this:—We need more-will to more-worth, and we need to more-word our more-well.

Let this not be too hastily called obscure. We fly so lightly to many-syllabled Latinisms and to hybrids of wordiness; why not try a little crisp English? We need here more words, almost as much as did the Buddhists. Never before has so much been written on psychology in education. It is inevitable herein that much must be said about will. It is so; and it is of interest to see in such books the groping after needed words. More interesting is it to mark in some such books, the wavering as to the nature of will, the poor insight into the child as being by nature a willer wielding will, and the often meagre way in which the 'good'—no, let me follow the other Western nations and call it the 'well'*—of the man, the well of the world, is put before the young as to be obtained by will, by 'more-will.' Everywhere 'will,' when it actually is used, does duty for both will and willer—a defect

* *Le bien, das Wohl, il bene, &c.*

brought over from yesterday's psychology. Thus we read in an American book : ' will is to will will '—a silly, because unnecessary wording. Again : ' we need a training not in knowledge, but in power,'—where the right word surely was ' but in will.' Then again, as to our need of ' more strength of will,' more ' intensity of will '—why not use the simpler, safer ' more-will '? Have we not retained the less needed compound ' moreover '? We drop glibly into the foreign ' plus ' in arithmetic, in technology, in golf ; but what's wrong with 'more'?

Now it may well be, that we want to distinguish between (*a*) the will we need to carry on, maintain, defend such ' well ' as we have, so much of good habit and worth, personal or communal, as we have acquired, and below which we do not wish to fall, and (*b*) the will to be called up, in some morning hour of life, when there is a forward move to make, a step higher, a breaking out of the groove, a crisis in will. To one ' loved ' man long ago that new will was called upon in this way :—' Just one thing you lack : sell all you have.....and come with me.''* At other times the new will needed may involve less of an earthquake. But as to all such crises,

* Jesus to the rich young man, whom he ' loved.'

would it not be a reasonable distinction to call the self-direction of the carrying-on rear-guard just 'will,' and the pioneer self-directing in the van-guard 'more-will'? A similar distinction might be made in the Better that we will to get or become. So much as we have worthed, held in worth, expressed in words and enjoy;—that is our well—our 'good,' if it please you better. That which we have yet to come to worth, and which we have therefore not yet well-worded—that which calls upon our 'more-will'—that is our More-Well.

These are simple suggestions, but they bear on great and urgent matters. We are in some danger at present of stooping too closely over our past. Our new world, our more-well, does not lie there among dead things. *Nor does it lie in just carrying on.* To each of us in whom is the forward view, there comes from time to time, in what we look upon as our welfare, a new feature of it, a new aspect of it, a new truth we had not seen before. Our 'well' takes on new worth; we want new words for it; we call upon new will to win it. In other words, we moreworth, we moreword, we morewill the more-well.

Others will one day find better ways, it may be, to word this very real thing in life.

Language is full of such increments in 'more-wording.' Some of these more-words we 'worth' and 'ward' badly, have done so badly in the past:—such are will, willer, well, werden. They can help us more than we let them. India is fully capable of giving us, even in English, 'more-words' in things that she 'moreworths.' She is, before us all, the land of the Word, the Speech, the Speaker, the Mantra-worder. She has loved much the spoken word, the re-spoken word, the words of the thoughts of the men of old, the Porāṇā. But time was when those words were new. She found new words when she was coming to 'worth' new ideals, to 'moreworth' old truths. She is now in danger of waxing very wordy in wording English speech of yesterday, English wordy ways of word-architecture, word-combats of to-day. Let her show the world that there are worthier things to value and to word than what men are mainly debating about to-day. Let her consider her worthy son who called to her with a new message, yet had not words wherewith to clothe it. Let her seek what he tried to show. Let her put forth 'more-will.' More-use in electricity is giving us 'more-words' from year to year. And when we can bring ourselves rightly to place in our

teaching the willer and the will, we shall find worthy words, because we shall have seen a fresh aspect, a new glory in that 'more-well' which is an evermore coming-to-be.

II

THE MAN

In the my preceding remarks :—' Will and the Way ' I spoke of the message of Gotama Sakyamuni as an appeal to the will in man which is ever seeking something figured as a better, worded under the symbol of choosing the right ' Way ' in wayfaring. I showed that the want of a fit word for will hindered the driving force in this message which we could put into it. And I claimed that this, coupled with the historical fact of the message being taught by a world of monks, had succeeded in largely distorting and withering its real meaning as a message for the whole of life (not of one earth-span only) to ' Everyman.'

We name the ' man ' in a worthy way when we call him Everyman. It is an old, a mediæval word in English literature. It has undergone revival and I am glad of it. I want to speak of Everyman.

In any religious teaching, in any philosophic teaching worthy of the name we are up

against the man, we are never far from the man. To speak of the man as body, and as mind under this or that aspect only, is to use object-words, not subject-words, is only to name ways, processes used by the man. Not one of them names the very man whose are the ways, the processes. Is there not more wisdom in the Indian teacher's injunction I quoted :—' Seek not what mind is ; seek the thinker '...and so on? But in the monastic teaching of Buddhism this is never the case. Deliberately the choice has been to omit the man, to consider the process ; to consider the very impermanent instead of the relatively permanent ; to consider the mind, not the mind-using man. The excuse they had is that they were herein protestants, revolting from the belief that the man was immutable in the midst of changing physical and mental conditions. But, as I have said, they threw away the baby with the bath-water. In 'Abhidhamma, over definitions of terms, they were also not without excuse in omitting the man. But this manless tendency runs throughout the religious exhortations of the Suttanta. In a religion which had come to culminate, not in the goal of all the worlds at the end of the Way, but in the perfected man, the worthy, the arahan, we find the man analyzed in objective

terms of mind, and the perfect man described in negatives.*

This is not the fault of its medium of speech, the Pali. Pali lends itself well to expression in terms of the agent. It is not often made so to lend itself, and in consequence tyros and translators not seldom fail when it does; but the Piṭaka editors, Majjhima-compilers especially, used such terms not a little. We find 'knower,' 'goer,' 'liver,' 'thinker,' 'speaker,' 'seer,' 'helper,' 'rearer,'† and many more. But never have I yet found among the foregoing any makeshifts for 'willer,' save perhaps *viriyavant* (once). And in the still little-known Commentaries, the use of agent-terms, *save in parables*, has lessened. Before their time—I mean, before they appeared in their present form—we see in the Kathāvatthu what a fight the orthodox upholders of the unreality of 'the man' had undergone to establish their dogma. The first and by far the longest dialectical chapter is on the 'man' (*puggala* = *puruṣa*). And the orthodox has to meet the charge that, after all, the truth-speaking Bhagavā made use of the word in his teaching.

* *Cf.* my *Buddhism in the Negative*, J.P.T.S., 1924-7.

† *Aññātar, gantar, caritar, mantar, vādetar, cakkhumant, anuggāhaka, uppādetar.*

The explaining away of his usage does not reach a comfortable settlement till, in the Commentary hereon—and before that, in the Milinda-pañho, we come across the distinction :—'highest meaning-truth' and 'conventional truth' (*paramatthasacca, sammutisacca*).* It was no sudden tumble, but at the bottom of a long chute that we find Buddhaghoṣa in pitiful error saying : 'There is no doer ; there is only doing.'

It was no error to see in the Bhagavā, in Gotama of the Sakyas, one who spoke in terms of 'conventional truth'—in ordinary language, that is—to men about man. The error would lie in assuming that he ever spoke to men in any other way. He is often spoken of as having created, or revived a 'philosophy.' This is only true in its primary meaning : that he was a wisdom-lover. But that he taught the many, the multitude, the plain man in language he could understand, having the while in mind a 'higher,' a truer meaning in his words ; that while he spoke to 'thee' and to 'you,' he saw no inmost reality, no very man-in-man, but only a 'complex' of body and mind :—this is a libel and a very black one. It is to see in him no

* *Points of Controversy* (Kathāvatthu), p. 63; *Milindapañho*, p. 160.

lover of wisdom, but a blind leader—though not of the blind, for Everyman, the plain man, would not follow him here. Everyman is a limited fellow. But like the child he is, he has retained much of the child's directness and simplicity. He is not congested with word-complexes. He holds that 'I am I,' have been 'I,' shall be 'I.' He will not admit, that 'I' am merely a label, a tie-word, a name for a bundle, a complex, even if it be conceded that the processes making up the complex are real.* He holds that 'I' am the bed-rock Real, the most real thing he is aware of.

But he will also admit that 'I' change, and not in mind or body only. 'I' am not the 'man I once was'; I was that man, yet 'I' am in a way a different person; and like Ophelia, I know not what I may be; none the less this he who was, who is, who will or may be, is this 'I'; a changing 'I,' a becoming 'I,' a growing 'I.'

Here his quarrel will not be with Buddhist philosophy. Here it is the pre-Buddhist and the post-Buddhist teaching of Indian religion and philosophy that he will not follow. Here

* So mediæval Abhidhamma; *cf. Abhidhammatthasangaha*, VIII, 14.

he was told, that the very man, being one in nature with Brahman-Ātman, is to be described as That alone can be described. And that is by many negatives, which exclude anything of the nature of change, such as augmenting or diminishing, becoming, growth, instability, otherwiseness. I believe I am right in saying, that little emphasis is laid on just this group of attributes in pre-Buddhistic thought. Perhaps it is not till the Bhagavadgītā took its present form, that we find this emphasis. And there is no lack of it in the Vedānta Sūtras. That work had to meet and fight down the counter-emphasis laid on change, transience, impermanence in the man by Buddhism. It is not surprising therefore to find there a new insistence on the absence of change and of becoming in a thing so real and eternal as the man. Buddhism had had its opportunity, and had failed. Over its submerged head the teaching of the very man closed to prevail once more, and with a surge not permeated with a new and vital truth, such as might have been the case, but with an error of developed strength.

It is to this way in religion, in philosophy, that the man of the people, the man with the heart of a child in such matters, will say: 'I know, know to the very root of me, know as

unanswerable, that in many things I am now a different man; I judge not as I used to; I see, think, otherwise; I plan otherwise.' He does not say: there is here a different judging, seeing, planning; he says all the while 'I'; if he does not say so in that way, he inflects his verb in the 'first person'—it's all the same. He is not meaning to say just 'there has arisen here a difference,' or 'my body, my brain, my heart, is now different'; or 'my mind, my reason, my consciousness is now different'; or 'my character is changed.' He means what he says; he means 'I' have changed, and therewith all that is 'mine' is no more as once it was.

Here then we have the plain man, the man of the many, holding to one way of thinking, where philosophers and churchmen may judge they see higher truth in one of two other ways, which we might call the limits at opposite sides of his way. The churchman may say: 'But we can give him milk for babes.' The philosopher may say: 'I live in communion with the chosen few. It is they only I wish to lead. The many will never understand.' In a way those are wise and these speak truly. Yet in a way the man of the people, in his acceptance of the very 'I' of him as real and as changing,

as becoming, is wiser and closer to truth than either of those parties when they deny either of the things he accepts. Slow is his advance out of ignorance. He has buttressed each stage of his becoming—that becoming which is the very nature of him—with very much that has to be loosened and pulled down before he can take the next step. But truth for him means at bottom, not an abstraction, not a word, but a true thing. And the word is of value only so far as it names a thing which he holds is true. A word-system which tells him either that the thing he names 'I' is not real, or that it is unchanging, is a teaching for which he has no use.

Yet he comes in his slow advance to have use for, to hold in worth the New. When 'at sundry times and in divers manners'* there has come to him—as come there yet will—a fresh mandate in the becoming, the further becoming of his manhood, he has accepted it; he has accepted it eagerly, for already he had been feeling after it. He has fought for it, died for it. He has seen that it belonged to his greater welfare as very man. Such a mandate will never have done either of two

* *Epistle to the Hebrews*, I, 1.

things : it will not have told him that as man, as ' I,' he is not real ; it will not have told him that as man, as of a nature not of earth only, he is unchanging. Contrariwise, the new mandate will have told him some truth of himself as man, as a child of the worlds, as a son at once of man and of the Highest, able as man to become, to make to grow that within himself which is of the nature of the Highest. It will have confirmed in him the conviction, that he is, as man, very real, that he is, as man, changing-into, becoming, *werdend*.

Now it is to this man of the people, to Everyman (or else to the man of the few whose heart beats with him), that the great mandates in religion have been revealed, have been sent. He is the ' many.' He is the ' world.' It is he who in the long run counts. His ' well,' his welfare it is, yes, and her well it is, which in very deed is the well also of the philosopher, of the religious teacher, of the monk. It is vain to speak of these three as growing towards perfection, as being ' saved,' apart from him, from her. With the many, in the long run, these three wax in their progress, and wane. And—again in the long run—the welfare of both these and of the many is intimately dependent upon their deepest convictions being true.

Hence arises the question : if the wise few deny that this or that deepest conviction of the many is true, will the wise with their denial and the many with their belief both attain the ultimate Well which is also the ultimate True? Must the many come in time to share in the denial of the few? Or is it possible that the few must come to see in the people's conviction something more true than their denial?

'Surely,' it may be said, 'the former alternative is right? The many must of course come little by little to attain to the standpoint of the few wise. Already have they largely done so in the case of the sun's rising and setting. They are now ready to deny that the sun does either.'

Analogies seldom fit the case nor does this one. There is no question here of the denial of the *existence* of a thing. The denial that the sun's *appearing* to do either is no more than the correction of an impression, and a true impression at that, of the sense of sight. Neither the existence of a sun, nor for that matter its own movement is denied. It is only a question of saying that the earth's rolling down towards, or rising away from the sun were a relatively more correct way of wording. And so unimportant, as error of wording, has

the old way seemed, that the wise few persist in its use. But in the dogmas : ' the very man, the self, does not exist, as not just body and mind,' and ' the very man, the self, is unchangeable,' we have gone behind sense-impressions, behind the ' how ' of phenomena. We are bidden to hold, on the one hand, that a deepest conviction of something real is of something unreal, and on the other, that our deepest conviction about the nature of that something real is a wrong one.

Let us not try to answer our question by the uncertain guide of analogy. Let us look to well-attested historical facts. Let us look (1) to the movements or messages we often call gospels ; (2) to the response made by the men of the people to gospels, to those gospels the influence of which has persisted ; (3) to the man of the mandate in them, the teacher, saviour, helper.

(1) Wherever and whenever ' gospels ' were uttered and spread, we note in them certain great common features. That is, in the first place, they are each and all addressed to ' the man,' not to anything external about him, or what is of the nature of an adjunct, or a factor, or an instrument, but—by implication, if not explicitly—to what we might call the

'man-in-man,' the *ātman* or very self of him. Next, they are all of them concerned with man's life, and its great significance for the man himself, now and hereafter. Lastly, they all speak, in terms of high worth and faith and hope, of man's nature, namely of that which he has it in him to become, of that which any and every man, in virtue of his nature, however he lives now, has it in him to become. And what is that? It is variously worded, both positively and negatively. We may sum up both ways by the words: to become Deity or to become perfect, or to put an end to ill, or become perfectly happy.

One word there is which may claim to include all these: the word 'well.' Man, imperfect, minor, infant as, in his earth-stages, he always is more or less, has it in his nature to become utterly *well*. Poor hackneyed little monosyllable that it is, few may be ready to see the depth, the breadth, the height in the range, the scope of it. Yet its negative equivalent: the end of ill (*dukkhass' antaṃ*) has stirred the earnest Buddhist imagination for ages. And again, it is a bigger ultimate conception than that of happiness, pleasure, bliss. To be well, utterly well, is not only a state to be contemplated or enjoyed as a consequence

of actions. It is a state of being after much becoming—it may even be a state of hyper-becoming. Happiness or its equivalents may be accompaniments, but they are that also in much that is not well. They are like the perfume, the colour of the flower; the 'well' belongs to the very growth of the plant. This is because the 'well,'* like the Platonic 'good,' is a term of the 'man-in-man,' that is of 'spirit,' while happiness and the like are terms of mind and body, the man's instruments. Mind, body, grow from infancy to adulthood no less than, it may be, does spirit. Soon body enters on decay, and to some extent mind also; mind decays much, if it be the body's servant, little, if it serve spirit first and body next and less. But growth of spirit, of the 'man-in-man,' is not so rounded off, nor need there be decay. Its beginning we do not know, nor its end. But the better, not the more or less of happiness, is the index of its growth. The Well belongs less to the little present world of things enjoyed; more to the world of one who would become fit to enjoy. The world of the Well is the world of *Dharma* in the fundamental meaning of that word.

* I plead for the use of *this* as a noun, as we say 'the good.'

This is the world of the may be, should be, ought to be, not the world of things as they are. *Dharma* (Pali : *Dhamma*) is a word we have not, a word I wish we had, in some equivalent form. ' Duty,' ' law,' ' norm,' ' ideal,' ' truth ' :—many are the makeshifts, not to mention ' doctrine,' ' teaching ' for the worded embodiments of *Dharma*. Complicated too is the term by its distinctive plural use, meaning in the Pali Sūtras just ' things ' (in the later Abhidhamma : states, phenomena), and by its usage as affix meaning ' belonging to,' ' of the nature of.' Let readers of Buddhism in its earliest records accustom themselves to use ' *dharma* ' as they have accustomed themselves to use ' *karma*,' keeping in mind this essential meaning : ' better than what is.' They may see how, thus rendered, it puts spiritual, religious power into the term ; for instance, in the question : ' What, sir, is your *dhamma* wherein you train your disciples, which they, so trained as to win comfort, acknowledge to be their utmost support and the fundamental principle of righteousness? ' (*Dīgha-Nikāya*, III, 40 : P. T. S. ed.) But more of this later.

By these common features we can see, that never, in a gospel, is the new message a denial of the truth, the reality, the worth of the man,

the person, the 'you,' the 'thou.' Always the appeal is to that which is, in the man-'complex,' not just a factor among factors, but he, she who responds, who judges, who wills, who chooses. Never is there a putting the factors into which the man may come to be analyzed in place of the very man to whom they belong. And always is the appeal made to man as being in a very imperfect state, but as having in him both power and will to change, to become, to grow. Always too is there reference to that becoming, that growth being continued, being ultimately consummated in a state which is not just man's present life on earth. We see I repeat, that the greater, widely accepted gospels have not started with any denial of, or even restriction in the reality of the very man, and that they have started with an implied belief in man's nature being to become or grow, that is, more widely stated, to change.

(2) It is not easy for us, to whose world no fresh gospel-mandate is just come, and who have very fragmentary records of the days when such a mandate was just come, to be wise about the response which met the bringer of such. But we seem to see this: the gospel made a singular, a strong appeal, the appeal of a supply to a demand; the response to something waited

for. They who were waiting were not in every case the very worthy, the very wise. But they were in a way feeling the need of some one to give expression and guidance of a fresh kind in the 'man' and the life of him. In the man who thus expresses and guides they find one who appeals to the very man in them, not to anything external about each, not to any worthiness in each, but to that in each who is in very need of him. Neither is it anything necessarily external about the bearer of the message, or anything reputed as of surpassing worth in him to whom or to which the great response is made. Something there will have been in the message to the man about his changing for the better that flashes like an electric throb from messenger to man. It is a message concerning the very nature of man in his long wayfaring toward That who is also of his very nature, his nature in very perfection as he is only perfection's germ. It seems to me that in no other way can we account for the extraordinary growing and expanding power shown at the inception of each great gospel-movement. It is true that the written testimonies are the work of votaries. But independently of the way in which these made record, the patent fact remains, that there was astonish-

ing growth and expansion. Many movements among men have begun, only to peter out; some of them of a religious nature. But only to a few such movements (and only along certain lines within these) can exuberant growth and lasting footing be conceded. These met some felt need, felt more especially there where the response to that need was first brought; but beginning to be felt elsewhere too. Something in the message, something in a new light, appealed to the growing, the becoming 'man-in-man.'

(3) Something too in the messenger will have made special appeal; something that made him in a way one with his message, so that it came to be said of him; his message is he and he is his message. I am not going here into the deep matter of his being specially mandated. Let it be enough in the present argument to affirm, that he owed the heed some paid him, the worth in which some held him—the number of such growing quickly—to this: he as very man, and not otherwise, spoke to the very man in each man, bringing a message about that very man, about his well, his welfare, now and to come, about his growth toward it, about each man's own work as willer and chooser in that growth, that changing for the

better. Doubtless he will have been personally attractive; even Sokrates was clearly that, and who can truly say, Sokrates taught no gospel, made lasting in scripture? But attractiveness of that kind has not sufficed alone to work a great change in the bases of religion. It was the way of the man as messenger, the word he brought, and that in the hearer to which he spoke:—these gave him in men's eyes a worth paid to no other kind of man.

Whatever the followers of such a man came to think of him, whatever they came long after to write about him, whatever they came to say that he said, never will it have been possible that such a messenger denied in man, in the very man, the reality of him, or denied his nature to be changing and therefore becoming. Never will such a helper 'unworth' the man, so as to make him *be* only what he has, only what he uses, only the way of his using. Never will such a helper so misconceive the man as to see in his very nature or essence the become, the finished, the perfected, and not him who is becoming, who *cannot but become*.

Let it not be supposed that I see, in the helper of men bringing such a message on man to man, one who is more than man. I do not hold he was that. I plead that, in order to be

and to become what he was, we must heed and worth him for the very man he will have been, and not credit him with sayings that cannot have come from him. And I have said, that of such sayings it is to have said : ' there is no very man (self or soul),' and : ' very man is unchanging.'

In these three points I believe the reader will find suggested an answer to the question raised above. Taken together the three amount to this : Man does not will to follow a teaching which makes no appeal to his inmost self. (Man here includes woman.) When man does follow a new word, he will have been seeking it. And the worder of it is a man to whom ' the man ' in men pays instant heed. In the whole relation, in its three factors : man the taught, the teaching on man, the man teaching, it is the very man that is in question, whether he be of the few or of the many.

It is of great importance to have these three factors in a true perspective in our historical vision, more especially when we are sifting old historical documents. For instance, in the last factor, the messenger : here the ancient tradition taught has been to see in him more than man, and then to credit him with any- and every-thing he is recorded to have said.

The very human man as speaking to the 'man-in-man' is lost to view. Then in the linking factor, the message to the 'man-in-man': this is also twisted and covered over by tendencies in teaching, which are secondary, or later, or both. Lastly the first term of the relation, man the taught, is not always well worthed. He is treated of as just multitude, mass, men. There is in an ancient book a fine simile about such men. They are like lotuses growing in a pool, those in the mass of blossom which are reaching the surface, are rising above it...*so* some have eyes less dust-dimmed, some are but little dust-dimmed...'*there are who will understand.*' These are few, yet are they of the many, of the people; these are they who have 'set going the wheel' of a new movement. With this it is usual to credit the messenger alone. But a great religion is no one-man matter. Between helper and multitude there is a mighty bond, welded by that which the one calls to in the other. And that is the manhood in man, the man-in-man.

There is the other simile drawn from the breaking-in of horse and elephant, of *purisadamma*:—the 'man who may be trained,' in other words, made to become what or how he was not before. These are said to be they who

respond to the teaching of the helper. In both pictures there is a sense of true perspective of the many. It is not of a herd, it is not of a mass of 'complexes' only, almost mechanically conceived. It is the many as this man, that woman, this child. It is to this one and that one, to 'you' and 'you,' that the helper will have gone, however much he may have been afterwards credited with delivering of 'sermons.'

It is, in the many, the 'I' here, the 'I' there who responds to the helper's message. He himself: *sayaṃ*, takes it to heart. We must not lose sight of this in our so-called 'psychology of the crowd.' Nor is it a fit argument for the '*an-atta*' dogma to say, as do new Western Buddhists, that this teaching is a condemnation of egoism, a (negative) support of altruism. For not only is egoism not involved in the belief that the 'man' is very real, but I have yet to meet with any early Buddhist teaching, in its literature about *anatta*, in which the ethical notion of egoism is condemned, or the ethical notion of altruism is praised.* I do not find old-world terms for

* Not till one passage in Milindapañha, and then it is not in the "Questions" proper, but by the author, who was I think not a Buddhist. *Cf. my The Milinda-Questions*, 1930.

either. There is nothing new in a man's putting himself first, or putting himself last. But I do not find that the altruist is ever said to act from his belief in *anatta*, or the egoist because he does not believe in it. *Anatta* was not ethical but just a corollary from 'things as transient' and 'things as ill.' And of these, the former was an anti-Brahman attitude, the latter was a monastic attitude.

It is a profoundly important point in the history of religious ideas that we of the West have here to consider, and to learn how to see in right, in true perspective. On the one hand we have the Indian faith predominant then and now. This believed in the reality of the very man, the *puruṣa*, as one in nature with the highest spirit:—'Ātman = Brahman.' It believed also, that, in virtue of this very kinship, the man himself could not become (*i.e.*, change) save only in body and mind. On the other hand we have the Buddhist faith predominant once in India, now elsewhere. This first warned its world against identifying the 'man' with body or mind, because these were weak, transient, changeable. Relatively, it said, body is more permanent than the swift-changing mind. It did not add, the very man or self changes usually even more slowly. But it did not deny

him or his changing—nay, the transformation by 'training' of the very man (*attan*) was its very stressed teaching. *Later* we see it denying that man was anything save the bundle of mental and bodily happenings, or that he became anything save the resultant of these happenings.

And on that important point of divergence I finish these remarks with three last words. (1) So far as we can trace it, the earliest (Sakyan) teaching we call Buddhist *did not deny the very man, or self.*

To see this, we must shed our own standpoint of the eighteenth century in force still with us; we must imagine the power of the word *ātman, attan* for an educated Indian of the seventh century B.C., when invited by a religious teacher that he would do well to 'seek the *attan*.' Almost it was tantamount to bidding him 'seek God,' or: 'seek the Holy Spirit within yourselves.' This is said to have been one of the earliest addresses of the founder of Buddhism.* It is historically of deep significance. And it is supported by many passages in the four chief books (Nikāyas) and the Dhammapada, where the subject is man's com-

* *Vinaya*, I, 23 (Mahāvagga, 1, 14).

muning with, and knowing *himself*—ways too of wording which are *not maintained in later teaching*. Several of these are quoted in my Buddhist Psychology ;* to cite them here I have no space. I hasten to add, that in mentioning them as psychologically interesting, I did not grasp (fifteen years ago) their deeper significance.

What *was* denied from the very first was that man, the spirit, the *attan*, could rightly be considered as either body or mind. Were he either or both, then as being things so weak and transient as either of these, he could not will-to-become (as will he did) ; he could not be chooser of his destiny. This is not to deny that the 'man-in-man' is. It is to say : 'Form not so wrong a notion of what you really are.' But to have said, at that day in India : 'You are neither the one nor the other, therefore you are not at all, you, that is, are just only a bundle of both,' would have made the new gospel an absurdity, an insult on the intelligence of the hearer.

(2) Yet even now the Southern Buddhist in Asia and the very latest writers on Buddhism in the West fail to discern the change which

* London : 1914, 1924, p. 28f.

spread like a very canker over Buddhism in this matter. I have tried to give a little outline of the growth in the *anatta* dogma in the chapter: 'The anti-soul attitude,' in the supplement to the work cited above.* It could be developed. It should be developed by competent critics—or proved to be untenable. But so far is this from being the case, that I have had under review books on Buddhism of these very years in which, unchanged, unimproved, the forthright statement stands, that 'the Buddha' denied, negated the soul! Is there none in India who will see, who will help?

(3) Is there none who will vindicate this helper of men, noble and wise? Is there none who will understand, that he who brings the new message, which we call a religion, to men is one who, whatever he did teach, did not teach certain things because he simply could not, being who he was, so teach. If we have, what I have put forward above as a right perspective in contemplating the relation: Mandater of gospel; the mandate or gospel; the mandated (viewed as the two terms of the relation and the bond between them), then shall we be sure, that the mandater in appealing to the very 'man-

* *Op cit.*, 2nd ed., 1924.

in-man,' could not tell the mandated, that this 'he' was not real, was non-existent. We shall be sure that he would, on the contrary, strengthen man's belief in his reality by enlarging man's knowledge *about himself*. No less sure shall we be, that the mandater could not, in so enlarging man's knowledge, and thereby bringing about a new becoming, a fresh change in man, tell the mandated that there was, in man, that which was unchangeable.

Ever have the great mandaters spoken as brother-men to their fellowmen. Never therefore could they worsen 'man' in their mandate. When we read of Manu as being 'taught by Brahman' to enlighten men, and then read, in his so-called 'Laws,'* penalties of utter barbarity to be wrought upon his humbler brethren, the Śūdras, we know that we are reading, not the worded will of Manu, assuming the belief in his high mandate to be right, but an unworthy addition by others. This is what I plead we must do in judging the Buddhist writings. This is not to create a fanciful figure in the mandater, and deduce his mandate from it. It is not to dictate what he will have said. It is to have faith in the nature and the Source of

* *S.B.E.* XXV; ch. I, §§ 57, 58; XII, 123, etc., VIII, 270ff.

his mandate. It is to believe that his mandate will speak to the very man-in-man, and will tell him the things that make for the Better, that lead to the Utterly Well. The way and the word of the man so mandated, bringing such a *dharma*, will have been what in Buddhism was fitly called *dhammatā*; the rule, the order, the law, the nature of that which works for the Better, for the Well. And of some ways, some words, we say, these are very surely not *dhammatā*.*

Not less surely do we say, this is *dhammatā*:—the nature of the 'man,' wielder of body and mind, he who wills the Better, who uses self-direction in so willing, who in working as he is willing becomes other than what he was:—this nature will not, in mandate or by mandater, be worsened and made unreal. Nor will they of the 'many,' to whom mandate and mandater first make appeal, see and be drawn by any message worsening and negating that in them which is seeking the Better. As merely body and mind men would be seeking a very mixed welfare. For the most part they

* This was worthily illustrated by Buddhaghosa as a fifth world-order (*niyama*), but it is unworthily explained to-day in S Asia. *Cf.* my *Buddhism* (1912), 120, 242.

have ever done so. For the most part they are doing so still. It is when they seek the Better for the man-in-man who is more than body and mind, that the worthier Better, the very Well becomes their quest.

III

MAN AND MAN'S WILL

In seeking a worthier place in our world-view, to hold good in both East and West, for the will, we considered, in our second article, the willer, the man. And if I now come back to the will, it should be to speak with greater weight, in that I bring with me an ally most indispensable. It is impossible rightly to appraise will without willer. In our Western academies we have long been trying to do so. We have the word willer as well as the word will, but you will probably not find the former word once in any work on psychology, or even on philosophy! It is perhaps significant herein that, while the West speaks of self, soul, spirit, it does not use the word 'man' as equating these. But India has done so, may still be doing so, and may she ever do so! And though, in speaking of 'man,' the 'very man,' the 'man-in-man,' I have been handicapped by departing from Western usage, I have felt all along, in addressing Indian readers, that

through their traditional word '*puruṣa*' they were keeping step with me as the West might not. In England we have seen but lately a well-known medical writer publish a thousand pages of an inquiry *In Search of the Soul*, before he comes to the conclusion :—it is truer to say 'man is soul,' than 'man has soul,'—as our world has till now persisted in saying. Had Dr. Hollander been a son of India, I scarcely think it would have taken him so long. So much may we be affected in our view and our work by the want of a word, or by a limit in the use of it!

We have a long way yet to go before the world brings itself to see, that man is soul. But I am not without hope. The other day I read that conclusion stated independently; the 'time-spirit' may one day come to say it always. But if India could be stimulated to teach us to say it, tradition gives her a better jumping-off ground than have we. We shall not always rest complacent in our view of man as a complex, a 'bundle' (*sasambhāra*), as the Buddhists said, of body and mind. Dr. Hollander himself inclines too much to seeing what is but a bundle in 'soul,' that is, 'as comprising intellectual capacities, emotions and instinctive impulses—indeed all that appertains

to the mind and character of man.' But the 'man' is not just the sum of his 'comprisings' or his 'appurtenances.' Nor is he even the product of these, as General Smuts's 'holism,' improving on the 'sum' or 'bundle,' would affirm. Man, I would venture to say, was not, as product, dictated to in his evolution by the 'sum'; *he dictates to the sum*. He mandates it; it does not mandate him. Only if he were matter, could it mandate him. If India, young India, who assimilates from us not always what is really worthiest in Western treasure of knowledge, would concentrate on giving us our lost, our never worthily realized Real 'the man,' this were a great gift indeed. For even where, in Europe, there is the double in words, as there was in Latin: *homo, vir, e.g.*, in German *Mensch, Mann*, usage does not give us, in the former, the '*puruṣa*.' German vision has become as limited as ours; 'Mensch' is but man in the mass. But I am concerned with *each one* in the mass, with man the person. We are but at the midway stage of knowledge, gripping the many in the one; we have not yet redescended into the new, the stronger grip of the individual. Where the individual is properly grasped, there the man becomes rightly worthed as 'man.'

In this sense India has both word and tradition. But the young are impatient, and rightly so, of tradition. I am with them in wishing to see tradition evolving into a new stage (as tradition is ever, if very slowly, doing). And here we have the better of her as yet in one word, even though we are neglecting our heritage. India used not, I have said, to speak of the 'man' as willer, nor that, in his self-directing activity, he was all the time 'willing.' She sees him as thinker, speaker, doer. But without the right bond underlying all the three, the first two are separated from the third. Doing, as such, is of the machine, is of the material. We are concerned with the 'man' as doer. To equate doing with thought and speech, we have to show all three as of the 'man.' And it is as fundamentally willer, that he does each of the three.

How strangely and pathetically interesting is the history of human ideas! Eastern insight sees the man as ultimately more real than his functions and factors. But lacking a further insight into his nature, it often represents him as straining away from his doing and deeds, as seeking deliverance from them, and seeing in man the contemplator. Western insight does not shrink from the deed, from

karma, as does the monastic of the East; it inclines to see man fulfilling himself, working out his salvation more in his deeds than does the East, yet it fails to grasp what is the ultimately real in the doer. And herein, failing also, Buddhism anticipated the West.

Without willer, I have said, there can scarcely be a worthy treatment of will. I find no satisfying handling of the subject in English analysis of will. This has now, so to speak, run-to-seed, in schemes of animal impulses and instincts. 'Will' has been pronounced as belonging to the early Victorian scheme of 'faculties,' that is, as constituting what may be called a separate drawer in the cabinet of mind. It is sought to oust it by such questionable terms as 'hormé' and 'libîdo.' But neither in such works is the subject treated as the self-directing of a willer, as inner activity of a willer. The procedure adopted is, we may say, by transverse sections of 'mental' process. Or if a source be referred to, it is frankly called 'animal,' not human. Conventional language must, it is true, be used in describing, for the normal man's experience is the main subject, and conventional language has never eliminated the man from man's experience. But he is talked of only to be dropped out of the

argument. Hume, for instance, in his famous attempt to ' catch myself,'—with which he has tricked so many in East and West—accepts as true what he experiences as ' his heat ' or 'his cold,' ' his loving or hating,' but fails to discern, under his very (spiritual) nose, the ' I ' in virtue of whom alone the feeling or emotion has any existence whatever. Neither feeling nor emotion, as such, is present *unless there be first the ' I,' the ' man.'* He put the cart before the horse, then unyoked and dismissed the horse. The cart makes no progress.

Neither does our psychology. One psychologist of distinction we had yesterday, who sought to restore to psychology the ' man ' it failed to bring along, when it was divorced from philosophy. " Why," said James Ward in effect, " since the ' I ' is implicit in all analysis of mind, and analysis should be exhaustive of its field, why ignore the ' I '? Why hide it away? " It was a fine start in a great reform. But he weakened his position, first by verbal concessions, which his rivals trotted out against him, and then, by not recasting the scheme of Victorian psychology, with its exposition, as a study not of mind, but of man the minder. So far as I can see, he failed to secure any following. The science was trend-

ing in a manless direction, and its tide he did not stem.

He had a special opportunity when dealing with will. He, if any one, might have seen that here, if anywhere, the man must be brought in. Yet here he brought no 'more-word.' Following the usual plan, he took will at the end, when he had spent himself already in emphasis. With academic lecturers, as with Indian commentators, much fulness at the start involves a shortage in time, or space, or energy at the close. Is it sad, or only amusing to think, how much in young thinkers the current neglect and ignorance of the nature of will may not be due to this hustling to make an end? Do I merely conjecture? Well, I have been present at such hustlings; I can hear the teacher say with a wry smile: 'I omit "time" for lack of it.' Space had absorbed overmuch of it. We know how important, in learning how we come to fill—*or deem we fill*—space, is the part played in that learning, by touch first teaching sight, and then by sight representing touch. Time has to take a back-seat, is referred to hearing only. And so we *never came to hear* the teacher's stimulating and suggestive thought on time at all!

In Alexander Bain's psychology the 'man' was shelved, but he made a notable start as to will. He *preceded* his discussion of sense and thinking by a glance at those actions, which do not seem to be made as a result of foregoing mental causes, especially the exuberant actions of the young. 'Spontaneous activity he called it, an excellent term had he looked more closely at its implications. '*Mea sponte*'—the Latin mother-idiom—forces *both* the 'mea,' the 'mine,' the man *and* his will, to the front! Here is no mere interplay of nervous and muscular discharge. The man, yes and the mere animal also, is in such actions expressing joyous energy with will-play in the healthy young body. But thereupon Bain dropped the will, picking it up again in the current vogue at the end of his work, after a long analysis of 'intellect' and 'emotions' with all the bottom knocked out of it. That thought and emotion are but modes, serious or trifling, of that same will-play is not conceded, and 'the man' only plays the part of a fiction of language.

Were we to begin our psychologies with 'the man' as an inexpugnable factor in all our conscious experience, were we to show all the other factors as the man's self-expression of a self-directing towards or away from—but

fundamentally towards—we should not cross-section our work on psychic life, we should get a unity and a cosmos where now we have a chaotic manifold. We should supersede the tripartite division of yesterday, and the invertebrate treatment of to-day. Ward, let it not be forgotten, did attempt a unitary scheme at the outset of his psychology. He could do so, for he took 'the man.' But he left out the will, left it out, that is, from its proper place. His scheme was one of 'Self and Presentations to Self,' feeling and action being appended as results. Now this was just the old-world view —I have enlarged on it elsewhere*—of man as spectator, rather than willer and worker, man as watching his world-pageant go by and naming it, as Adam did the beasts and Gotama Buddha the factors of mind. It leaves out, does such a scheme, what Adam did to the beasts, or with them, and why. It loses sight of the fact, that man only so watched *because* he wanted to act, to get, to become. Fundamental alone is movement, and the inner, the incorporeal movement or activity is most rightly expressed as will. For this inner, or psychic activity is at bottom effort to get, to win, to

* *Buddhist Psychology*, 2nd ed. (supplement) Epilogue; *Will and Willer*, Ch. I, pp. 6ff.

become. This is why we call it self-directing. This is why, without the Self, we can only treat of it as a merely physical force. Will is the act of 'mandating a mandate by the mandater.' To choose, to worth, to mandate are all inconceivable functions to impute to a physical force only.

And man's will is at work when he is thinking, whatever be the mode of his thought. This was curiously overlooked by Coué and the auto-suggestionists, as I have said elsewhere.* They require the patient, when in a given physical state, so to dispose his inner (psychical) world as to imagine he is what he is wishing (as patient) to become. This, they say, will prevail where will cannot. But they are using will in a too narrow sense, in the sense, to use a medical term, of 'synergy.' Nothing in either the French or English language justifies this forcing a contrast between 'will' and being just 'willing to imagine.' Nor could anyone deny that the prescribed work of imagination was other than a 'voluntary' act. Thinking in any form is man willing with order, system, articulation, enunciation of what he himself experiences whether this be as true, or as beauti-

* *The Will to Peace*, pp. 39ff.

ful, or as better, or as their opposites. And feeling, emotion is the *man reacting* to the work of will in worthing. I have compared it to a reverberation, to the vibrating of muscles working—mere physical terms, which do not really help. We can understand what our books have called somatic resonance, bodily reverberation. But in the very man's reaction we are up against an ultimate, where description in terms of anything else is mere analogy and metaphor. *We are the man*, we are the ultimate, whether we be willer willing, or willer reacting. Our psychologists have found in feeling the state most unmixedly subjective. But this is largely because their view of man has been so limited: firstly as to the man himself, secondly as to his inner world being wholly not partly active, wholly not partly dynamic. They have tended to look upon feeling as passive. Yet there is no phase of our inner world, in suffusion, in diffusiveness, in 'expansiveness,' so dynamic as feeling. We look on the word emotion too much in the way of the new French passive participle *émotionné*. Feeling is reacting, not the having reacted. We may say that the 'man' is never passive. When the body is utterly passive, it is, as his medium of self-expression, at its lowest terms.

Either the man is needing it relatively less, is playing slowly, softly on it; or it is not in a state of physical efficiency as instrument. In sleep the 'man' is not passive, but that problem I cannot take up here. The West has much yet to learn in it; so has the East, only less. The West will grow wise in it when it worths the man; the West will grow wise in it when it worths the will.

Is there no one, in either East or West, who will give us a psychology not of mind or of consciousness, but of Man the willer, a psychology of Man and Man's Will? One thinker we have yet with us who some years back showed a noble impatience over our denseness. He made appeal to the little world of psychologists —but, alas! to no wider world as well,—with an essay on a scheme of 'Conational Psychology.'* In it he tried to show will, conceived in a wide sense as 'conation,' as the fundamental factor in all phases of mind. I do not know who first used conation, I think it was Sir William Hamilton. Dr. Johnson knew it not. It was to mean tendency to act, trying, or striving—the German *streben*—so

* *British Journal of Psychology*, December, 1911: 'Foundations and Sketch-plan of a Conational Psychology.'

that we might have a simple elementary term, without the mixture of feeling there is in desire, or the intellectual mixture there is in judging, or resolve, and so forth.

From the point of view of the academy this is very plausible. If psychology is to be ranked as a science, it is not reasonable to grudge her technical terms.....And yet, by her very subject, it is for her to walk, not in the grove or the Stoa, but in the marketplace, yea, in the home. Our age is feeling this. Our press is feeling this. It is flooding us with book and with article on the mind of man, not only on the body of man. Health in mind and body is the cry of to-day; the need of the new world after long days of fearful waste and suffering. The general reader, the general listener-in wants to know. Psychology *cannot afford* to be technical, if she is to be efficient, if she is to help man to know himself. She does not need to be technical; if she is worth her salt, she can quite well help him in the terms he knows well. She has to make these terms more, not less efficient, wider, not narrower. Let her use will in its full scope. Let her make a great word of 'Well,' not a feeble adverb. Let her find a great and simple word for 'Werden!' Let her deepen 'man' to mean

man's very nature, not body only, not mind only, nor the sum, nor a complex, nor a product of these.

Let her do all this as training, as mothering, as preparing the general reader, the general listener-in for the fate that will one day be at hand: the fate, the day of the new mandate, the day when he will rise on the stepping stones of old creeds to receive new light on life, on the worlds, new light that he will receive, will accept in proportion as he has been looking for it, training for it.

I do not find that Professor Alexander's Conational Psychology won any more followers than did Ward's Self-headed Psychology. I only wish it had. I speak with diffidence of one so wise and by me so honoured, but I venture to think, that such want of result as actually followed was due to three things:—he was timid and tentative where he might have been firm and uncompromising; he did not posit the 'man' in the forefront, but introduced him incidentally, as it were by a side door (on the 19th page and in a note); he used for his central idea a weak ineffective term. He confessed to a desire to supersede cognition by conation. But his theory called on him to go further and to make conation supersede mind.

'Mind is made up of conations'; he wrote;... .....'there is nothing in the mind but acts'; 'every mental act is a conation and is nothing else':—these are emphatic uncompromising sayings. And if a reformer, if a pioneer do well to call a spade a spade, instead of some less true, but prevailing name, then in this author's diction conation should have practically ousted mind, when used in a more than specific sense. But it did not do so. Moreover it is an awkward word; it names but thing, not act, not agent. And it is of mushroom growth. These *together* make it unfit to name a great fact, one of the biggest facts of our life. My own teacher made a similar effort to push the word 'intellection' for thinking or cognition. It was doomed to failure, and for the same reasons. He judged that cognition involved 'object' too much for psychology, *i.e.*, consideration of process. Professor Alexander held that will also involved 'object,' and was therefore presumably too specific, too little general a term.

The anxiety of psychologists to wean their subject from its mother is to me a little pathetic. It is an artificial screening off during analysis, which may at the moment be very useful to the pupil. *Beyond that* it is cramping, and in the long run futile. For the psychologist has more

than the classroom to consider. And that is the progress, the growth of world-ideas. The world is waiting for him, waiting for him to give it, not analytic cross-sections of life, but world-mandates, ' mondial ' mandates, about this very big thing in life which it generally calls mind, intelligence. If he will tell the world that this is really and more truly ' conation,' and why, the world will probably pass by on the other side. It has done so. If psychologists will take a great, old word such as men all use, use especially in crises big and little, a word hallowed by its association with a widely spread creed,* and if they will admit this word in their analysis to the wide meaning it can bear, and not nail it down to the narrower meaning it often (but not always) does bear,—if in a word they will use ' will ' as the general name for the inner or psychic activity of man the willer,—then they will call to men with more chance of being heeded, then will they be bringing to men a mandate pregnant with the future, then will they be showing men what a sword to cut down ignorance and evil they have in their own, their inherent nature. A technical term takes root quickly when it words some conquest over that

* " Thy will be done...not my will, but Thine be done."

which is not ourselves. But it may be otherwise, when man is called upon to reshape his very self-knowledge. Easier, quicker will it be for him to do when the names in the reshaping are already used in that self-knowledge. Such are the names: 'man' and man's 'will.'

I said above: such as all men use. But that this is not true of India I have done my best more than once to show. That India could have shaped a true word for will and did not do so, is an important historical fact, which writers (and translators) should not either evade or glide over as they so far have done. But I am not fanatical on the subject; I am no less keen to worth the makeshift terms that we find. Let us briefly review these. And let my point herein be noted: we do not find man generally described in terms of any one of them, with one solitary exception. The general description of man in nature or agency will be in other terms (such as those in which my first article opened).

The solitary exception is that "man is made of '*kratu*,'" "consists of *kratu*"—*kratumayaḥ puruṣaḥ*—This is in the sayings attributed to Śāṇḍilya in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Dictionaries give *kratu* as meaning 'purpose, plan, design.' Max Müller tran-

slate it here by ' will ' ; Re Hume, by 'purpose' ; Deussen and Bloomfield, by ' insight ' ; Tatya, by ' reflection.' The word is plentifully used in Vedic writings and, with regard to India generally, tests my position to some extent. Had Indian teachers realized the truth and importance in Śāṇḍilya's saying, it is possible that they might have reshaped their view of man, and have fostered the use of the word in its Vedic meaning. But that meaning seems to have died out, and *kratu* to have become merely or mainly a term of ritual. Anyway, whereas it was a word very suitable for the vocabulary of early Buddhism, whereas it was a word which it is hard to conceive the Founder not using, had it been current in his day, we do not find it in a Pali form in any of the sayings in the Pali books. It is highly probable that, as a psychical term, it had then become as obsolete as, in England, another valuable psychical term, the term ' inwyt ' also became obsolete.

The somewhat similar, if weaker, compound term *saṃkalpa* (Pali : *sankappa*) seems to have been replacing it. It is not a Three-Veda word ; it first appears in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa. It has the meaning of purpose no less than *kratu* ; it suggests 'thought' at least as much as ' wish-to-do ' ; it suggests

work of mind when confronted with need of action, that is, of overt action. Hence translators are seldom at one how to render it, as I have shown elsewhere. Now this word was current, it may be said, in Gotama's day. It forms a 'limb' or aspect of the 'Way.' And though the limbs of the Way called the 'eightfold' may well have been an expansion made by the Sangha of the more probable threefold, older division of human action, so often ascribed elsewhere to the Founder, it is just possible that this expansion was made before the end of his long life. Elsewhere the word occurs seldom, but always its meaning is dynamic. Thus in the Sutta-nipāta we see the aged loving disciple Pingiya telling how, his body inert, he lies in thought, "by *sankappa's* going," ever to the beloved Man.* Again we read: "Is his mind (*manas*) well aimed as to all creatures? Is his *sankappa* as to the desired and the undesired under control?"† The satisfied person is said to have his *sankappa's* fulfilled.‡ And the word is used in two other categories, both concerned with conduct. The later definition of *sankappa* in Abhidhamma is also

* Verse 1144.
† *Ibid*, ver. 531.
‡ *Majjhima-Nikāya*, twice.

dynamic, at least as much as it is the opposite. It is made an equivalent of *vitakka*, which is an active, attentive aspect of mind; as such it is likened to fixating, focussing, setting thought on to the object.*

This is not without value in a gospel of the will as was the Way. But this is all. Save in the numberless reiterations of the Way as eightfold, *sankappa* plays a very thin part, and, separately, less use is made of it than of any of the other seven 'limbs.'

But, it will be said, what of that other compound: '*sankhārā's*.' And what of its first, and perhaps therefore its dominant item: '*cetanā*'?

As to *cetanā*, a word which in structure is simply 'thinking,' it is true that it has come, in modern and possibly mediæval Buddhist schools, to stand for the Western word will or volition. It is possible that, in course of the growth of thought and word, the lack and the need of such a term had come to be felt. But in the Pali scriptures this feeling is not manifest. It is true that once *cetanā* is called *kammaṃ* but then all mind, all thinking is rightly called *kammaṃ*, *manokammṃ*, and the

* *Dhamma-Sangaṇi*, § 21.

point of the text* is that *cetanā* is action of mind: 'having thought (or purposed), we act in thought, word and deed.' Together with *cetas*, *cetanā*, like *manas*, has to do double duty for thought and will.

And as to *sankhārā*, a word which is not Vedic, and at least as applied to our inner life, must have been new in Gotama's day,—we have seen the same thing happen even in our day with the word 'complex'—it means not a force such as is will, but any mental manifold, any mental compounding. The notion of activity is present, and to bring this out, I have substituted 'activities,' and 'synergies,' for the more static 'syntheses' of my earlier work. But the emphasis in the term is in the 'manifold' rather than in the activity. It must be remembered that the Buddhists were what we would now call pluralists, keenly interested, with the spirit of their age, in the manifold and the analysis thereof. It was the *many in man*, not the man, that drew them. Their interest herein was that of the doctor in disease. Both compound action and the compound thing were impermanent, woeful, not the 'man.' The

* *Anguttara-Nikāya*, iii, 415.

Well they sought they came to word later as the 'uncompounded datum'—Nirvāṇa.

So far then we have not lit upon a simple equivalent for either will or willer. Now when once there is purpose, aim, plan, there *has been will at work*; there is now emergence. For that matter India is not found speaking of man even as planner, purposer, aimer. Let us fall back on the words *preceding* his action as such. There is, I have said,* desire: *kāma*. Here is a strong simple word that might well have served as does our will. In one passage only, to the best of my knowledge, does it so serve: —'Man is altogether *kāma*; as is his *kāma* so is his *kratu*; as is his *kratu* so is his *karma*; as is his *karma* so is his destiny.'† It is a noble and pregnant utterance, foreshadowing in its last clause much of India's religious teaching. But as to its first clause, the level of truth was not maintained. The Vedas had already declared *kāma* to be 'the first seed of mind.'‡ Here we have the static worthing of man's inner world preoccupying the later sounder position of the Upaniṣad reformer. And later

* Page 3.

† *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4, 4, 3.

‡ 3 *RV.* X.

usage worsened *kāma* to mean the urge to sense-pleasure. Religion, coming to take its stand on the moral betterment in man, found in it no worthy instrument.

Chanda practically shared the same fate. Almost the Pali scriptures suggest an effort to salve it from sensuous uses, and worth it as will, or at least as worthy desire. We even have it guarded later by the prefix *dhamma-*, 'righteous desire.' I do not value its apparent promotion in the Iddhi-pāda formulas; it will there have originally meant 'mantra,' its other meaning; the presence of *viriya* almost justifies this conclusion. But nowhere does it really rank above just 'wish'; nowhere is it given any important place in man's nature or conduct; it is often made equivalent to *rāga*, and the saint is said to have laid it aside. It was too suggestive of the more radical *tṛṣṇā* to commend itself to the ideal of the monk.

Then there are the words for modes of will, the words for effort, endeavour, energy. Here we see a notable contribution by Buddhist thought. Here we see how Buddhism needed the wording of will, how largely its teaching had been at first shaped to be a training of man as willer, how far from true it is to speak of it as an unmixed Quietism, or pessimism, albeit

it came to be largely the one and the other. *Viriya* and *padhāna* are worthy makeshifts for will; the former is peculiarly Buddhist from the first; *padhāna* is not solely a Buddhist term, yet it was chosen for the formula best showing the attempt at systematic will-training in the teaching. As such it is always called the right effort (*sammā*=). To *viriya* there was not only given a place in the expanded formula of the Way, it was also made one of the five spiritual faculties (offset doubtless to the five senses); a host of interesting equivalents go to describe it in Abhidhamma,* and to it is given man-value, agent-value, in the word *viriyavant*, *padhānavant*, albeit such use is very rare and perhaps poetical only:

so viriyavā padhānavā dhiro tādī.†

I have called the evangel, starting what we know as Buddhism, an appeal to man the willer, that is, the seeker after, the chooser of the Better, who inevitably becomes better in choosing the better. I called this a great opportunity, missed because of two things: the traditional view of man as radically thinker,

* *Dhamma Sangani*, § 13.
† *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 531.

and the vehicle of monk-monopoly.* In the next chapter I have tried to show how the vehicle missed the right 'Way' by dropping the 'man.' Here I have showed how the vehicle, handicapped from the start by having no fit word for will, tried to some extent to make good by a fairly worthy emphasis on makeshift terms. After all, you will say, the Buddhists were aiming at the evolution of the perfected man, the arahan, or even a Buddha. And for this, individual effort, individual resolve were essential.

This is true. But note how they cut the ground away from under their feet. For their perfect man they had no worthy conception of the very man, the man-in-man. This was no unseen very-real, akin in nature to That Whom he sought, expressing himself by will-, or mind-force in the seen body. There was but a compound of mind and body—so it came to be held —and the only worthy perfecting was of the mind. Yet this was expressly held to be 'not of you,' not the very man (*attan*). And since all that was body and mind was *anitya*, subject to birth and death, the only way to conceive the perfect man, *i.e.*, mind, was as the done, the

* Page 16 f.

ended, the completed, the will-less, the done with life, done with the better, done with the yet to be, the yet to become. The formulas describing the saints and saintship show this very clearly.

Let us not quarrel with Buddhism because it took as its ideal the man made perfect. Is there any other religious ideal so worthy as this? Where we may join issue is with those Buddhists who cramp and contract that ideal. It is a cramping of that ideal to judge that any man can attain, or can ever have attained perfection on earth, so that at death, even if he come not again to earth—that may well be—he ceases to be man, he ceases to become.

Of this more hereafter. Had the followers of the Founder and of his worthiest fellow-workers grasped the very truth, which, in spite of want of the word—the new bottle for the new wine—he tried to teach in 'the Way,' I think they would have found fit words. They could have taken up old words, like *kratu*, or framed new ones. Language, I repeat, is strewn with these increments. Some man in India, long after the beginnings of her literature, brought in *saṃskāra* some man brought in*saṃsāra;* some man converted *hita* into its meaning of welfare, and we could, any of us,

quote other cases. And it is not always, if ever, the inventor of the new who finds the fit word. Ask Signor Marconi! It is the men who are to the fore in worthing and taking up what he has thought and uttered.

But the after-men of Buddhism were not worthing as of central importance what their founder tried to say in terms of the Way. It is a very tragedy, but not found in Buddhism alone. They were monks whose central theme was that the world is ill, and this was the world they had left, left the growth of it and the working with it and fellow-sympathy with it, brotherhood with it. Will, the will to become —how were they likely, with such views, to find a fit word? They only lit upon *tṛṣṇā*, *taṇhā*, for 'will' meant more life, and that, even in any world, was in the long run 'ill.' Other worlds, as ways for ever nobler exercise of will, were no more appreciated. Life in them must be met by *nirodha*: stopping; the will to live must be stopped. They dropped the man, wayfarer through the worlds. Was it likely that they would seek to name man's will which is the man's most essential self-expression?

IV

WAYFARING AND THE COMING-TO-BE

Does the title recall to anyone his youthful wayfarings? Such are present to me now. Child of English country life, to me the annual summer journey 'abroad' was a great event, great not least in this, that the return meant chiefly two things: altered perspectives and the sense of something different in *me* when studies were resumed. The home looked smaller, and so did much else. Music—it was my chief study—was grasped and interpreted in a somewhat bigger, wiser way, even if fingers and voice were 'out of practice.' The wayfaring had been a coming up against the New more impressively, more concentratedly than this was effected by life at home. It had been a forcing-process for the young 'puruṣa'—that was I. In response I had grown, I had become, I had come to be.

Others may have seen no change after those few or more weeks. But there are no two opinions about the change wrought in the traveller by greater, longer wayfarings. The

woman, the man who returns is clearly not the same, especially when the journey has not been a mere drifting, but a purposeful matter of research, or even of pioneering. The change is not only in body or mind. These it may be need repose; these may have grown in hardihood, in resourcefulness. It is the very man that is different, different in his outlook, his values, his self-expression. He has been in the world of the new. He has become more sensitive to what at home is not new, is even mouldy. He has widened and deepened his knowledge of the man-in-man, for whereas he has seen him under other conditions, in other bodily vehicles, amid other traditions, he has found under these the man, the fellow-man. He has found him as more worthy, more worthless. He has found him adapting those different conditions to life as he wills it to be. (Too often we word it the other way, speaking as if man adapted himself only, and were the mere creature of the conditions. But this is a wrong estimate, even of primitive village life.) And he returns from travel with some impatience for the standpoints of the untravelled: the standpoint of the one language only, the one code of this or that, the ignorance of the unwonted, the dislike of the new, the narrower

values. He has seen and has come to worth the man in the wider way of living. His wayfaring has made him a "more-man." Possibly not altogether a more worthy man, but in either case, better man or worse, he has changed not only in body or mind, he mandates himself differently now, he has 'become,' he has come-to-be.

That man's life is a wayfaring—a Mārga—is one of the greatest figures of human speech because it is so close to world-truth. Even were there no greater way of the worlds, wherein the man-in-man, the *puruṣa*, is literally a wayfarer, the figure would still be most apt. For the way implies choice of better or worse; wayfaring brings growing fitness in wayfarer; wayfaring brings the New, brings the further view, and heads for a Goal. To the superficial reader the figure of the Way (*mārga*) may seem to stress but little the individual wayman, and to call up mainly the many. It would not be a figure of world-truth, if it were not of all. But it is curious how empty of comment on its significance for the individual is the literature of and on Buddhism. I am not saying that man's growth towards saintship as a way, or that man's conquest over birth and death as stages in a *magga* are not prominent teachings. But

I do say, that the doctrine of *the man as wayfarer in a way*, taught *as a figure*, full of suggestion and picturesqueness, full of meaning and attraction for the Everyman to whom it was first worded, is lost sight of. And why? Because the Buddhist exponents have not as monks welcomed all that wayfaring means; and because *their* cramped use of the glorious figure has put non-Buddhist commentators off the scent.

Let us go further into this sentence, taking it in backward order. Writers on the Buddhist gospel have seen in its 'Magga' nothing more than one way of teaching among other ways. This, it is true, appears to have been one of the current secondary uses of the word. A good instance is in the Tevijja Suttanta (Dīgha-Nikāya, I, No. XIII). Two young Brahmans are disputing whether any of the 'maggāni' (*sic*) taught in their schools is "the straight way, the thither-faring road leading...to companionship with Brahmā?" But the luminous reply ascribed to Gotama shows how, in his message, the 'way' was *so much more* than any course of teaching prescribed by him, or to be associated with his name. The 'magga,' for him, was *man's very life*. And it was this, and this alone that would always be guiding

the man to the Highest (whom, never having seen he could not know), because the man, conceiving the Highest as the Best, would by persistently choosing to live his best, be ever becoming more and more like that Best. Worthy most truly is a word like this to stand beside that of Hosea: "then shall we know if we follow on to know;" and that of John the Elder: "Dearests *now are we* the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that...we shall be like him..." It is probable that the Way has come to us so congealed in its rather unfortunate Eightfold uniform, and in that other formula of a 'Truth,' that our writers have not seen its true significance. It is when we cut these shackles off by noting where, and how 'way' and wayfaring survive in the records, when unhampered by them, that something of its original strength and significance stand out.

Notice for instance the allusion in the very venerable Pârâyana, last book of the Sutta-Nipāta. Here it is no detail of thought, word, or deed, here is no harping on 'ill;' here it is the forward way and the goal giving their name to the book:

> He who would practise as the Teacher taught,
> 'Tis he may go from hence to the Beyond;

Yea, hence to the Beyond 'tis he may go
Making the Way-incomparable to become;
The way this is for going to Beyond,
And therefore is it Yonder-faring* called.
(ver. 1130).

Nor in this brief sampling let us forget to notice what is generally overlooked: Gotama's name of 'caravan-leader' (*satthavāha*):

Uṭṭhehi...satthavāha...vicara loke!
'Arise thou leader of the caravan and tour the world!'—

a name for Buddhas which we find again in two anthologies. I do not wish to stress much this *adjunct* of the Way-figure. The very pith of the parable was that each wayfarer should be himself *satthavāha*, 'bearer of the goods,† the Good within him, and chooser of the Way. I bring it in to show the lingering dying tradition of the Way as once a great symbol of man's life, and not merely the ethical rune as which it is usually presented.

It may be said, why was it not picturesquely presented in the first manifesto, or 'sermon'? That it was so badly stated is to me a more convincing sign that that 'sermon'

* *Pārāyano*, Fausböll's rendering is here feeble.
† *Sa-attha-vāha.*

was a genuine first utterance, than if it had been as picturesquely given as are subsequent talks on roads. It was only when, as a new teacher of the many, Gotama spoke to this man and that of life as a 'way,' full of adventures unknown, unpredictable, appealing to the young, and having a wonderful Beyond, that he would himself come to see what a rich and strong appeal lay in it. I can see nothing unreasonable in the guess, that the swift success of his teaching among the many: the merchant and the land-tiller, the craftsman and beast-tamer, the woman and child, the hunter and bandit, was in part due to the fascinating and stimulating picture of man as wayfarer from the known to the unknown, of how welfare lay in getting further, of how getting further depended upon right wayfaring here and now. There was nothing wholly new in the figure. The way—*yāna* not marga—of the Fathers, and that of the Gods was an old Vedic idea. But this of the Magga was more than that; it was a bringing of life as travel, in Bacon's immortal words; "home to men's business and bosoms." And could the vehicle of the teaching have been the layman, could we have had in Ganges valley a little world of John Bunyans, teaching the notion of the 'pilgrim's

progress ' as the ' way through the jungle,' not so much with a load of sin to be discarded, as with an ever growing force of *attha*—of ' good,' of ' well '—to be carried along, we should not now be seeing the Buddhist dhamma so lamentably misrepresented as a gospel of ' ill,' of world as good for nothing, of not-man, not-becoming, as in its records it came to be, as in its monasticism it has continued to be.

Buddhist monks, and not laymen only, have been, and I believe are yet, pious pilgrims. The sadder it is and the stranger, to see how in the past they failed to worth the figure and the truth of the greater pilgrimage. But the lure of the roadway and even of the seaway still calls to man, even though, in his ostensible aim as pilgrim, he shows that he has missed the true call of his religion. But I fail, I repeat, to find any grasp, in the scriptures, of the Way as a parable of life. I would be frank about this, no matter whether I shall thereby be judged as forcing ' parable ' or figure on to a mere term of means or method only. There is one poem in the Piṭaka anthologies solely about the Way and one only : that by one Migajāla, and very eloquent it is. Here and there it shows real insight. In the first place it ignores the eightfold analysis ; I mean, the ' limbs ' are

omitted. It just hints at how *magga* is not merely *saṃsāra*—and here I seem to have missed the point in translating, and am fain to amend. One of the rich, rolling compounds describing the Way is *sabbavaṭṭavināsano*, translated

> ' (through it)
> All constant rolling on is razed away...'

This should have struck me as a terribly bad recommendation for a road, and it will have been just the utter atrophy of the Magga as a picture of life, and not as a mere rule of doctrine that made me blind. It should have been :

> ' All constant rolling *round* is razed away.'

In the monkish doctrine of Ill ; *saṃsāra*, which in Gotama's day meant the flowing *on* of life from world to world *came to be* conceived as a round, a wheel, *āvaṭṭa*, *dukkhavaṭṭa*, with no indication of *parakkama*, going forward, *niyyānika*, faring away to. Negatively then Migajāla has got the idea of progress. The Buddhist idea was to get out of *saṃsāra* into *magga*. The sounder idea would be thus :— "in the life-faring (*saṃsāra*) choose the *magga*, that is, the *right mode* of faring." But then the world-despairing idea of the monk was

to bring life in worlds to an end. Life in worlds as the true, the only way of self-fulfilment, was not accepted.

The poem also speaks of act and cause in the Way, and rightly. The way was conduct, and the way was man in his acts *becoming the cause* of his progress—only Migajāla didn't see it. But he has a noble ending.

Mahâkhemangamo santo pariyosānabhaddako.

> 'Yea, to the mighty Haven doth it wend,
> Holy (the faring), well (for thee) the End.'

And yet, for all that he conveys in his sonorous periods, there is nothing to show the very essence of the Way, nothing to keep the reader *off* from the idea, that here is a road along which mankind, like sheep, are being *shepherded* by Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha to salvation, nothing to show the reader that the Magga means a man's so living, so walking as to be and do his best, *as himself the* 'satthavāha.' But it is this, *and nothing but this* that makes of that famous Way-sermon, not a mere line of doctrine, not a mere code of good thought, word and deed, but a very religion, an inspired call to man from That who is both Source and End.

Nor is there anything in the verses to show an awareness that wayfaring in the 'Path' meant in the wayfarer a continual progress, becoming, growth. Words were not lacking here. There is praise elsewhere for the woman if she show 'Ariyan growth' (*vaḍḍhi*).* Here and there the Anthology reveals yearning for, or joy in, progress. And we saw, in another Anthology, the intelligent disciple 'creating' (*bhāvento*), lit. making become, the Way he has chosen. There is nothing of this in Migajāla's vision. For him the Way is a record of unworthy and dangerous things by it destroyed, with no grasp of the wayfarer as pioneer and adventurer hewing down obstacles in his own case, such as a Bunyan would have given us. And so it comes that the stately rhythms roll over and off us, leaving no deepened insight into this Way of the worlds, no conviction that here we have a man who knew himself as a high-spirited and hopeful carver-out of Magga in his own case.

Migajāla is no exception in this oversight. Indeed he is better than many, for he does hymn the Way, as no one else did. But we seek in vain elsewhere for intelligent grasp of

* *Saṃyutta* IV, 250.

Way as meaning Dhamma, and of Dhamma as meaning Way. Dhamma, I repeat, is the seeing in life the 'ought,' the 'should be,' 'may be,' the 'to be.' And here lies also the force in the figure of the Way. But there is no possibility of the To Be coming to fulfilment in any man in this life only. It means many, many lives. It means a very great deal of Bhava, becoming. And the monk set himself against Bhava, set himself to win Nirvāṇa by a cutting short of the long drawn out becoming. Herein, I believe, lay the root of his failure to worth in justice and honour, the great message of his founder.

As a general result of this dread in the coming to be, the emphasis in Buddhist teaching of the Way is narrowed down to (*a*) its being an avoidance of the extremes of self-indulgence and of asceticism—a merely negative setting—and (*b*) its being a set of eight dispositions in worthy living—a merely moral description. But that is not by any means all the worsening wrought in it by the failure to see the true meaning of life itself.

(*c*) It is significant that Buddhism developed no worthy word for 'life.' The fine word *jīva* we hardly meet with; *jīvitaṃ* usually accompanies risk or loss of life. The world-

word for life which had come into use : *saṃsāra*, had come to have the sinister meaning in Buddhism which we should expect to find. *Magga* was meant to mean choosing aright and so coming to be, *i.e.*, growing, in Saṃsāra. Instead of that, the Way, as we saw, was made not the improver, the developer, but the destroyer of Saṃsâra.

(*d*) Again, already in the editing of that first sermon in a fixed wording, the Way with which it opens is dethroned from its central position, and made into a fourth portion only in the formula throwing the chief emphasis on Ill. This is editorial work, and not good as such. But its effects have been very great.

(*e*) Again, it was true, and worthy, to speak of the Messenger of the Way by the name suitable to the figure, of *Satthavāha*, with its double word play of *sa-attha* (he with the goods) and *satthar* (teacher). But we must go back again to the ancient Sutta-Nipāta to find the *follower* also spoken of as a 'Way-man,' of the better or worse kind : 'way-victor, way-teacher, way-liver, way-corrupter.' Other books, the Majjhima school especially, see in the founder alone the Wayman : Way-shower, Way-upraiser. That each man, each woman was wayfarer, waymaker, wayworther,

waychooser :—of any of this we find nothing. And it is only too consistent with the gradual dropping of the ' man ' from the caravan, that in the Jātaka, in the figure of life's chariot driving, the charioteer, said to be ' the mind, is the sole occupant of the chariot.*

(*f*) Again, with the Way of the worlds sinking to a set of dispositions for this life only, it was not surprising that the still preponderant belief in the worlds of pre- and after-life, coupled with imperfect grasp of them as opportunities of greater becoming should lead to the emergence of another Way : the Fourfold, or the Four Ways and Four Fruits. Here we see a new standard of weak faith brought in : life measured not by the so much of desire and will accomplished, but by the so much of the undesired worked off, *e.g.*, ' once only back to earth ' remaining, and ' never back to earth.' What an outlook it is ! outlook of the timid, the burnt child, the shipwrecked on the sands of time, the man who has given up. It has been a great disutility to the real message of the Way. It has drained from that a fit wording of the Way's Goal (for to its credit this later Way *is* a world way with a goal). And the real

* No. 544, ' Mahānāradakassapa Jātaka.'

Way, thus blooded, has shrivelled up to being practically a Way of this earth-life only. So much so, that I have heard Europeans asking whether Buddhism taught survival at all, and I have read young Ceylon saying in print, that the Buddha taught, it was only this life that mattered, and that the 'other life' could take care of itself. How have the founders of great religions not been crucified anew times without number!

(*g*) Lastly the unworthing of life as a progress, a growth, a development through the worlds, involved the worsening, the lowering of a word of incalculable value, a word the worthy representative of which in English hampers me here at every turn. I mean the word *bhava* and its causative *bhāvanā*. Here we have a word, or dual words, ready to India's hand when Buddhism arose, and fraught with no such worsened meaning as, *e.g.*, *kāma* had come to have. *Bhava* is of the ancient Aryan word treasure. *Bhāvanā* is of very much later growth. No Vedic book appears to use it. The citations of it in the Boethlingkh-Roth Dictionary are only from mediæval Sanskrit works, save one reference to Mahābhārata XII. It was there for the using, if we may accept the Piṭakas as evidence, in Gotama's day. We

find it in the Four Nikāyas; we find it doing service for a meaning where the word 'will' is lacking:—contrasted with terms of intellectual procedure, such as 'what is to be understood,' 'what is to be put away by insight,' 'the strength of calculating,' these being so many and several methods to which *bhāvanā* is the contrasting complement. There are few words which I imagine Gotama will have used more readily, more earnestly. For as I have tried to show, his figure of the Way meant little, if it meant not that deeper progress which the traveller undergoes, progress in more than the mere matter of distance in space traversed. The Way is not merely a figure for man's life or lives:—*saṃsāra* expressed that. The Way is not merely a figure for an orderly shepherding of man's life; *cariyā*, *ācāra*, and many other terms convey that. The Magga was a figure of man's nature, man's life in *its bedrock essential*, and that is a *bhava*, and a *bhāvanā*.

I will go so far as to suggest, that Buddhist early influence, yes, and Jain early influence too—the Jains also have *bhāvanā*—promoted the use of this word, a use in which it is very possible that early Yoga teaching gave them a lead. But the strong rich meaning of the term *bhāvana* (and *bhāvanaṃ*), to which justice is

he showed the close bond between his Way and Becoming, between man the Wayfarer and man as grower, as progressive, as coming to be, as 'he who makes to arise' (*uppādetar*). These things will happen—do we not see that it has happened in other creeds?—when the followers have not been big enough to rise to the level of their founder, and of his true soul-mates. But the tradition of the early teaching of that close bond still flickered in the life of the Order. And here and there we come upon an outcrop of it, as geologists would say. Very slight they are, but in view of the opinion about them obtaining among contemporary rival schools, they are far too much ignored.

Beside the allusions given above, I will quote a reply ascribed to that lovely woman, the lay-disciple Visākhā, partly because *bhāvanā* does not come into the formularized portion of the reply; partly because the English translation is not apt. Visākhā (*Vinaya*, Mahavagga, VIII, 15) in describing the benefit she will reap if permitted to exercise further generosity, speaks of the joy, content and peace she will feel (so much is put into editorial formula); then goes on: "that will be to me a 'becoming' (or growth, *bhāvanā*) in moral sense, in moral strength, in wisdom." It has

been translated 'an exercise,' but Visākhā is clearly speaking of effect, of fruit, of result of exercise. Now no one made finer response to the founder's teaching than she, and it is possible that she was reacting to the stress he will have laid on the *bhāvanā* of the man, that is, of the man-in-man.

Note, too, that she says "there will be in (to) 'me' a *bhāvanā*." It is true that her natural, direct speech is editorially emended, and instead of Visākhā, we get 'her' split up into '*indriyas*,' '*balas*,' and '*bojjhangas*.' Here as elsewhere we see the decadent work, whereby the once natural converse between teacher and disciple is redacted into an expulsion of the 'man,' and a substitution of functions and processes. We may see this in the term *mano-bhāvanīyo* of the Suttas, used to denote the earnest liver, and by the Commentator Dhammapāla equated as '*mano-vaḍḍhanīyo*,' 'he whose mind is growing.' We lose sight of 'he whose' in 'mind.' But a ray of light comes from the Dhammapada, the anthology where the 'man' (*attan*) has, for some lost reason and in many a verse, been suffered to persist. "Better," we read, "is the homage paid for but one moment to him-of-the-self-that has-grown (*bhāvit-attānaṃ*), than a hundred

years of sacrifice to the Fire at the cost of a thousand.'' The commentator glides lightly over the thin ice here, as he does elsewhere in passages affirming the *attā* (vide *passim*); he just parses by *vaḍḍhit 'attānaṃ;* he does not give us makeshifts in terms of skandhas for the for him perhaps awkward word *attānaṃ*, He merely repeats it; indeed in the preceding verse, beginning with its emphatic *' attā have ' jitaṃ seyyo*...he is concerned not with how one is to understand *' attā '* but only with the grammatical anomaly of *jitaṃ* for *jito*. Nor is he more explicit throughout the subsequent chapter called ' Attavagga.' He is in fact seeing in the word nothing more than the linguistic convenience of ' self-' as a reflexive affix. But the significance for us lies in this, that as an analytic paraphraser, he refrains from drawing any distinction between this usage and that reality (in his tradition a non-reality), which *attā* means here or anywhere.

One word more on *bhāvanā* :—Very noteworthy is the Buddhist choice and retained choice of the verb, when a word is needed to express man's activity in what, in my first article, I spoke of as ' more-will.' In other words, when the man who is seeking the more-worthy way is at work upon the new, the un-

wonted, the abnormal, the word *bhāveti* is used. This was more especially when he was engaged in Jhāna and in the Iddhipādas. In the former, he was working to get rapt from both the outer world and from work of mind about it; he was seeking access by hearing (though this became dropped from the tradition) to another world: Rūpa or Arūpa. In the latter he was using will in an intenser degree to obtain an abnormal development or 'becoming' in himself. Very vigorous terms of effort are used in the will-training formulas called 'Right Efforts,' but not *bhāveti*. The use of the word in Jhāna is highly significant, for that which the man is 'making to become' is 'magga,' the Way, to another world. It is the meaning of the Way in the first sermon. You may translate it, for Jhāna, 'means of access' if you will, but it will mean the same. For Way is means of access and this after all is the greater meaning of life itself, the meaning of life for the 'man,' the 'man-in-man,' who is child not of this or that world only, but of all the worlds, of the Eternal. Jhāna was a forestalling the arrival by death at another world by a communing with it here and now, a search-light as it were, thrown upon the way ahead.

So much then at least remains in the Buddhist scriptures of a mandate on becoming and making to become, which dates, to my belief, from very early days, because it belongs to the full and true conception of what the Way of the first sermon implied and involved. For I would say it once more—so has it been overlooked—'way' means progress, unfolding, coming to know, coming to be. This is the peculiar Buddhist emphasis lying in Way, more so than any external goal of fulfilment, any externally conceived share of consummation. For Dhamma is not 'anywhere,' Nirvāṇa is not 'anywhere.' The Divine is of the man. But the full becoming of That is a long, long business, a long, long wayfaring.

And too much is it forgotten by modern Buddhists, that it was not as advocates of the impermanent, or the Not-man that mediæval India held them to be in error. It was because they, the Bauddhas, maintained the becoming of that which is from that which is not.* I am not taking up the foolish word-quibble here,

* *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* Nārāyaṇa on Gauḍapāda's commentary, Sūtra IX.

which does not see, that given an eternal source, there can never be any time when it can be said 'nothing is.' I only refer to it to show how the tradition of *bhava* and *bhāvanā* will have lingered, even in the decadent Buddhist Sāsana of mediæval India.

Why then do words so really fundamental in Buddhism as *bhava* and *bhāvanā* appear in the scriptures, the one with the condemned meaning of *Āsava* (canker) and *Diṭṭhi* (speculative opinion), the other in so hole-and-corner a fashion that no writer on Buddhism gives due heed to it? I return to the answers given earlier in this my last chapter. The monk, because of his world-lorn theory of Ill, set himself against *bhava*, refusing to see in life and more life the given opportunity, the only possible opportunity, for that unfolding, that educing, that developing, that making to become, implied in the man's coming to maturity, to perfection. Starve, root out desire for *bhava*, he taught; get to the End as soon as possible, the end of all this appalling ill. He had no forward view. It was only in retrospect that saintly singers found food for joy. It was to satisfy a much later wave of longing that, in the Milinda, Nirvāṇa in this life is described as the City of the Ought-to-be, the holy Utopia.

And the 'man' too, the *puruṣa*, being starved out, rooted out, the process, the work of making-to-become, only retained worth by being transferred to the *ways* of the man: his faculties, his mind, his wisdom, his more-will, his rapt musing.

Had not this woeful blindness come upon them, had they clung to their Magga, to that for which it really stood, and not cut from their feet all that makes for the 'man's' life-wayfaring, they might well have come to anticipate the centuries and have used their *vivaṭṭa*, the very word of 'evolution' itself. The word is almost solely applied to the evolution and involution (*saṃvaṭṭa*) of world-change. But a near approach to its application to man occurs once in the line:

> Thus by the evolution of the deed (*kammavivaṭṭena*)
> The man who spoils is spoiléd in his turn.
> *Saṃyutta-Nikāya, Kosala, 2, 5.*

So near were they and yet so far! So near it would seem there came to those after-men of the Sakyaputras the great opportunities:—

> Daughters of Time, the hypocritic Days
> Muffled and dumb, like barefoot dervishes,
> And marching single in an endless file,
> Bring diadems and fagots in their hands.

To each they offer gifts after his will,
Bread, kingdoms, stars, and sky that holds them all.
I in my pleachèd garden watched the pomp,
Forgot my morning wishes, hastily
Took bread and a few apples—and the Day
Turned and departed silent...
I too late
Under her solemn fillet saw the scorn!

Emerson.

With sorrow not with acrimony can we not also say of those followers, that they forgot the morning-will of their great Teacher, who taught the Way of man's coming to be; that they turned in fear from the nobler gifts in the hands of their Day; that they hid the man-in-themselves of the Greater Garden; that they rejected Bhava and preferred mere Anitya; that they 'took hastily' the bread of the little garden of the pleachèd lines of the cloister, seeing only danger and worsening in the wider work, the longer way that lay beyond the walls?

Unworthy through the evolution of their 'man'-less tenet to reform the Brahman tradition, and too wavering in their faith in 'becoming,' in evolution, to build up a recreation of that tradition, they faded unhonoured, unlamented out of India. And in the daughter

churches of Southern Asia, the children of the Mother-sāsana took over and fostered the belief in a Magga that was wilted, a man that was a mere complex, a Becoming that was only of 'dhammas,' states of mind, and an acquiescence in the social supremacy of the monk. We have evidence (such as it is, no more) in the Ceylon epics, that this was so from the first missionary campaign sent there. Of the ten 'texts' of sermons quoted, while the monk-ideal is stressed, *bhāvanā*, growth in holiness, is ignored, and the Central Message of the Way, the first 'sermon' is, almost as it were thrown in, *the last*! The first text, it is true, is of stories, but then the sermon was to the ladies of the court—good enough perhaps it was thought!

Ended now are these few Kindred Sayings, and may they find readers who are both critical and well-disposed. If I have had an uneven road to travel, it is firstly, because the writer, using a language which has dropped its worthy word for *bhava*, writes of a mandate given in a language which never had a word for 'will,' secondly, because the writer, in dealing with what is now of the past, of the old world, has for theme that which was, that which is ever the New.

In many things have we given the lead to Europe. If in one century for instance, we wrenched off the shackles of despotism, France did so a century and a half later, Russia, Germany and Austria more than a century after that. Yet are we, if not in act, yet in word and code, lovers of the old, the established, the wonted. Significant herein is our heedless dropping, of all words, the word which most worthily expresses the coming to be, the New, emerging out of the old: *wairthan*, the *werden* wisely preserved in Teutonic tongues. We have to fall back on the weak word 'become,' which while it means the 'coming to be,' means no less the 'suitable.' India had of old, as the Teutons have still, the double wording of existence: *asti*, *bhū*; 'to be, to become.' Whether in her many modern tongues she retains both, my ignorance knows not. The important problem for her and for us is: so to worth 'becoming' that either in fostering or in recreating we have a fit and worthy word for it.

That anyway is the heart and the aim of what I have here tried to say. That anyway is the very bond and kinship in these 'kindred sayings':—Our will is the fundamental inner (or psychic) activity of the very 'man,' the

puruṣa. In willing he is 'becoming' other than what he was. Hence as in a way 'new,' newer than before, he goes on to will the new, because he has gone on to 'worth' the new. And the newer, the better, the best he goes on willing is of and for the very man. This is the Way and man the Wayfarer; and the End is not yet. This is the Way of man; this is the Magga of Gotama.



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